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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-105661 | 2026-10-18 | N/A | ||
| Requesting `/{username}/-/repositories` for an individual user instead of an organization made the organization home handler dereference a nil organization and panic. The request needs no authentication and no special configuration. The server answered with an HTTP 500 error and logged a panic for each request; the fix returns 404 for individual users. | ||||
| CVE-2026-109553 | 2026-10-18 | N/A | ||
| Gitea resolved the principals of an SSH certificate by searching the content of all stored public keys instead of only principal keys. When Gitea trusts a user certificate authority (`SSH_TRUSTED_USER_CA_KEYS`) and accepts arbitrary principals (`SSH_AUTHORIZED_PRINCIPALS_ALLOW=anything`), a user could register another user's public key line as their own principal, or a holder of a certificate signed by that authority could list it, and then authenticate as the owner of that key through the HTTP signature API and the built-in SSH server. Instances that do not trust a user certificate authority are not affected. | ||||
| CVE-2026-104627 | 2026-10-18 | N/A | ||
| The Gitea OpenID association callback in the security settings accepted a positive OpenID 2.0 assertion without checking that the signed-in user had started the linking. Because OpenID 2.0 allows unsolicited assertions, an attacker-controlled OpenID provider could attach the attacker's identity to the account of a signed-in victim who opened a crafted link, and the attacker could then sign in as the victim through OpenID login, which does not apply the local TOTP or WebAuthn checks. The callback now requires a time-limited `state` value bound to the user. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98584 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: fix potential stack infoleak in em_text_dump() em_text_dump() allocates struct tcf_em_text on the stack without zeroing it. strscpy() writes the algorithm name and a NUL terminator into conf.algo[], leaving the remaining bytes uninitialised. nla_put_nohdr() then copies the full struct to the netlink response. KMSAN on Linux 7.2-rc6 reports two kernel-infoleak splats from this path, one triggered via "tc filter show" and one via a raw RTM_GETTFILTER dump: BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x1c9/0x2620 nla_put_nohdr+0x83/0x130 em_text_dump+0x291/0x550 Local variable conf created at: em_text_dump+0x5d/0x550 Bytes 168-179 of 199 are uninitialized I am not certain whether this constitutes a real security problem in practice: the test was conducted in a controlled KMSAN environment and the leaked stack bytes may or may not carry sensitive data on actual production kernels. I am reporting it because KMSAN flagged it as a kernel-infoleak and the fix is straightforward. I can provide a userspace reproducer on request. The original code used strncpy() which zero-pads to the destination size. Commit b04202d6065c ("net/sched: replace strncpy with strscpy") replaced it with strscpy(), which does not pad, creating this condition. Zero-initialising the struct closes it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98586 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: hold asoc or transport before mod_timer() in timer handlers Take the association or transport reference before rearming a timer in the timer handlers. The existing code calls mod_timer() before taking the reference needed by the rearmed timer without holding the sock lock. This creates a race with timer cleanup: if the timer is deleted after mod_timer() returns but before the reference is taken, the cleanup path can drop the timer's reference and destroy the transport or association. The timer handler then takes a reference on the already freed object and eventually drops it, causing a refcount underflow. Hold the object before mod_timer() and drop the reference if mod_timer() reports that the timer was already pending in timer handlers. Apply the same ordering to the proto-unreachable path, which can rearm a transport timer outside the timer handlers without holding the sock lock. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98588 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, sockmap: Reject max_entries > INT_MAX in sock_map_alloc sock_map_alloc() only rejects max_entries == 0 and otherwise allows any u32 value. sock_map_free() then walks the sks[] array with a signed int iterator: int i; for (i = 0; i < stab->map.max_entries; i++) struct sock **psk = &stab->sks[i]; When a SOCKMAP is created with max_entries = 0xffffffff (UINT_MAX), the allocation of 32 GiB can succeed on large-memory hosts. During free the counter reaches 0x80000000, wraps to INT_MIN, is sign-extended by movslq and turned into a ~16 GiB negative offset from stab->sks, pointing far below the allocation. The faulting access is an xchg() write in sock_map_free(). Without KASAN, the same out-of-bounds write can fault on an unmapped vmalloc page or corrupt an unrelated allocation if that vmalloc address is populated. On a KASAN kernel with CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC=y, the shadow check for that address hits an unmapped shadow page and oopses first: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffff521b59c5a00 RIP: 0010:kasan_check_range+0x107/0x190 Call Trace: sock_map_free+0x93/0x190 map_create+0x68d/0xb30 __sys_bpf+0x21e/0x2e70 Vmcore confirmed stab->map.max_entries == 0xffffffff, stab->sks == 0xffffc911ace2d000, and the faulting address sks + (s64)INT_MIN * 8 exactly at 0xffffc90dace2d000. The same buggy path is reached on the normal close()/bpf_map_free_deferred() path whenever such a map is destroyed. sock_map_alloc() used to bound its allocation size through bpf_map_charge_init(), but the bound was dropped when rlimit-based memory accounting was removed. Reject max_entries > INT_MAX at creation time so the signed iterator in sock_map_free() never sees a value that would overflow. Triggered by syzkaller and reproduced on both a 6.6-based KASAN kernel and the upstream v7.3-rc2 kernel. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98595 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udp: remove a disconnected socket from the 4-tuple hash table A UDP socket bound to a specific address and port keeps its entry in the 4-tuple hash table after it is disconnected: sk binds to 127.0.0.1:21001 sk connects to 127.0.0.2:20001 // filed in the 4-tuple table sk disconnects, connect(AF_UNSPEC) // still filed, peer now 0.0.0.0:0 __udp_disconnect() takes a socket out of that table only as a side effect of ->rehash() or ->unhash(), and it skips ->rehash() when SOCK_BINDADDR_LOCK is set and ->unhash() when SOCK_BINDPORT_LOCK is set. commit 6996a2d2d0a6 ("udp: Unhash auto-bound connected sk from 4-tuple hash table when disconnected.") fixed the same end state for a wildcard-bound socket, by a path this one does not take. The entry is counted whether or not anything hits it. hash4_cnt on the hash2 slot stays raised for as long as the socket lives, so udp_has_hash4() keeps sending every packet for that address and port through the 4-tuple lookup first. On IPv6 it can also be hit. __udp_disconnect() does not clear sk_v6_daddr, so udp_v6_rehash() files the entry under the peer the socket was connected to with a zero dport, and inet6_match() compares that same field: a datagram from the former peer with a zero source port matches, and source port zero is accepted on receive. On IPv4 the peer is cleared, so a match would need a zero source address as well, which the routing layer rejects as martian. The stale sk_v6_daddr is a separate defect, not addressed here; removing the entry closes this path either way. The entry can also be relocated. __udp_disconnect() clears sk_bound_dev_if, so a subsequent SO_BINDTODEVICE calls ->rehash(), and because the receive address is still specific udp_lib_rehash() moves the entry instead of removing it, into the bucket that (rcv_saddr, num, 0, 0) hashes to -- a pure function of the address and port, so every socket reaching this state on one address and port collects in one bucket. The bucket cannot be chosen from outside, as udp_ehashfn() is seeded with a per-boot secret. This last one became reachable only with commit 644f9108f3a5 ("udp: Make rehash4 independent in udp_lib_rehash()"), which moved the hash4 handling out of a branch a disconnected socket does not take; the stale entry itself dates from the commit in Fixes. Take the socket out of the table before __udp_disconnect() runs, while it still matches how it was filed. This also reaches the wildcard case ahead of udp_lib_rehash()'s udp_unhash4() branch, leaving that branch unreachable from udp_disconnect(); removing it belongs in net-next. udp_disconnect() and udp_abort() are the only UDP entries into __udp_disconnect(), which is shared with raw, ping and l2tp sockets that are not struct udp_sock: ping_prot.obj_size is sizeof(struct inet_sock), so udp_hashed4() on one would read past the allocation. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98597 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: usb: sr9700: include receive overhead in the length check The receive fixup subtracts the Ethernet CRC from the reported packet length, but compares that payload length against the whole remaining receive buffer. The following copy starts after the three-byte header, and the cursor advance consumes both that header and the four-byte CRC. Require the payload to fit after SR_RX_OVERHEAD before copying it or advancing to the next packet. The loop already ensures that the remaining buffer is larger than the overhead, so the subtraction is safe. The issue was found by our static-analysis tool. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98598 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: Prevent rt6_insert_exception() for dying fib6_info. Before the cited commit, fib6_nh_flush_exceptions() always set from->exception_bucket_flushed = 1 under rt6_exception_lock to prevent rt6_insert_exception() from inserting a new exception for a dying fib6_info. The flag was replaced with the FIB6_EXCEPTION_BUCKET_FLUSHED bit stored in nh->rt6i_exception_bucket. The problem is that now the bit is only set when the bucket is not NULL and fib6_nh_flush_exceptions() is called from fib6_nh_release() after fib6_ref has already reached zero. If rt6_insert_exception() is called while the target fib6_info is being removed via fib6_purge_rt(), a new exception could be created successfully because rt6_flush_exceptions() no longer sets the bit. This creates a reference cycle between the fib6_info and the exception route, leaking the fib6_info, its nexthop device, and all per-CPU routes in fib6_nh->rt6i_pcpu, which stalls netdev unregistration. [ 34.680602] unregister_netdevice: waiting for gre6 to become free. Usage count = 68 [ 44.920675] unregister_netdevice: waiting for gre6 to become free. Usage count = 68 [ 55.176582] unregister_netdevice: waiting for gre6 to become free. Usage count = 68 Let's call fib6_drop_pcpu_from() before rt6_flush_exceptions(), to set fib6_destroying before rt6_exception_lock, and check f6i->fib6_destroying in rt6_insert_exception(). Note that FIB6_EXCEPTION_BUCKET_FLUSHED logic is dead and we can clean it up in net-next. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98599 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Reject non-negative offsets in stack_slot_obj_get_spi() bpf_get_spi() computes (-off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE using C division, which truncates toward zero. For off == 0, this produces spi 0, the same index used by the valid stack slot at fp-8. stack_slot_obj_get_spi() currently checks alignment and the resulting spi bounds, but does not reject the non-negative offset itself. It can therefore validate a PTR_TO_STACK register holding fp+0 against an iterator stored at fp-8 even though the runtime receives the actual fp+0 pointer. An effectful iterator kfunc can then interpret memory outside the BPF stack as iterator state. Reject non-negative offsets before converting the offset to an spi. All valid stack objects begin at a negative offset from the frame pointer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98600 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Reject short EA=0 frames in rfcomm_recv_frame() While rfcomm_recv_frame() verifies that skb->len is at least sizeof(*hdr) + 1 (4 bytes: 3-byte header + 1-byte FCS), an RFCOMM frame with an extended 2-byte length field (!__test_ea(hdr->len)) has a 4-byte header plus a 1-byte FCS (5 bytes minimum, sizeof(*hdr) + 2). When a 4-byte RFCOMM frame with EA == 0 arrives: 1. The initial skb->len < sizeof(*hdr) + 1 check passes (4 < 4 is false). 2. Trimming the FCS byte decrements skb->len to 3. 3. If __check_fcs() succeeds, skb_pull(skb, 4) fails (4 > 3) and returns NULL without advancing skb->data. 4. Because the return value of skb_pull() is ignored, the un-pulled 3-byte struct rfcomm_hdr remains at skb->data and is either queued as application payload via rfcomm_recv_data() or parsed as a multiplexer control command via rfcomm_recv_mcc() on DLCI 0. Fix this by extending the length check in rfcomm_recv_frame() to also require skb->len >= sizeof(*hdr) + 2 when !__test_ea(hdr->len). | ||||
| CVE-2026-98602 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: bnep: fix out-of-bounds reads on short RX/TX frames and control fallthrough Fix multiple out-of-bounds reads in Bluetooth BNEP frame processing: 1. In bnep_rx_frame() and bnep_ctrl_frame() (net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c), use pskb_may_pull() to verify the BNEP header, control type byte, filter count, and extension headers exist before reading them, and return 0 after handling BNEP_CONTROL instead of falling through to Ethernet frame submission when no extension headers follow. 2. In bnep_net_xmit() (net/bluetooth/bnep/netdev.c), verify skb->len >= ETH_HLEN with pskb_may_pull() before reading the 14-byte Ethernet header to prevent an out-of-bounds heap read and infoleak on short AF_PACKET TX frames. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98603 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ovpn: replace bind when clearing stale local source The UDP output fallback clears bind->local in place when the remembered source address is no longer usable. The bind is RCU-published and read locklessly by concurrent TX, so an IPv6 reader can observe a torn address. Retry the route lookup with source address autoselection without modifying the bind. After a successful lookup, revalidate the bind and route key under peer->lock, reset the dst cache, and best-effort publish a replacement bind with a wildcard local address. Do not cache the resolved dst when clearing the local source. Replacing the source invalidates all per-CPU cache entries, while dst_cache_set_ip4 and dst_cache_set_ip6 update only the current CPU slot. The current packet can still use the resolved route; if bind allocation fails, a later cache miss retries the repair. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98606 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/virtio: release the GEM object on virtio_gpu_vram_create() errors virtio_gpu_vram_create() frees the object with a bare kfree(vram) on both error paths after drm_gem_private_object_init() has run, and on the second one after drm_gem_create_mmap_offset() has linked obj->vma_node into the device's VMA offset manager. The freed object stays in that interval tree, so a later lookup or insertion walks freed memory, and the dma_resv and gpuva lock are never destroyed. Call drm_gem_object_release() before kfree() on both paths. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98608 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/virtio: fix object leak in virtio_gpu_resource_create_ioctl() virtio_gpu_resource_create_ioctl() calls drm_gem_object_release() on the drm_gem_handle_create() error path instead of dropping the reference it owns, so obj->funcs->free() never runs and the virtio_gpu_object, its pages and sg table, the resource id and the host-side resource are leaked. Use drm_gem_object_put() instead. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98686 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: discard post-EOF pagecache when extending a file via zero range smb3_zero_range() removed the pagecache only for the range being zeroed, so when it extends the file the folio straddling the old EOF - which may hold data dirtied past EOF through an mmap - was never dropped and became visible as file content once the file was extended. Lower the discard boundary to the smaller of the zero-range offset and the old EOF. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98609 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/virtio: fix object leak when drm_gem_handle_create() fails virtio_gpu_gem_create() owns the reference taken by virtio_gpu_object_create(). On the drm_gem_handle_create() error path it calls drm_gem_object_release() instead of dropping that reference. drm_gem_object_release() is the inverse of drm_gem_object_init() and does not touch the reference count or call obj->funcs->free(), so it is only correct as the last step of a destructor, as in virtio_gpu_cleanup_object(). Using it here leaves the bo at refcount 1 with no remaining reference, so virtio_gpu_free_object() never runs and the shmem pages, sg table and virtio_gpu_object are leaked. Since virtio_gpu_object_create() has already set bo->created, VIRTIO_GPU_CMD_RESOURCE_UNREF is not queued either, leaking the host-side resource and the resource id. drm_gem_handle_create_tail() drops the handle reference on all of its internal error paths, so the caller only has to drop its own. Use drm_gem_object_put(), matching the success path below. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98612 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: usb: catc: bound the RX packet length in catc_rx_done() catc_rx_done() walks a multi-packet URB, reading a two-byte length from each packet header. Its bound, pkt_len > urb->actual_length, ignores the header offset and compares against the whole transfer rather than the bytes left from pkt_start, so a crafted packet header makes skb_copy_to_linear_data() read past the buffer. A length below ETH_HLEN is also accepted, including zero, and eth_type_trans() then reads a MAC header from the uninitialised tailroom of a shorter skb. The is_f5u011 branch takes its length straight from the transfer, so a zero-length URB reaches the same path. Track the bytes remaining from the current packet, and reject a header that does not fit, a length past what is left, and a length below an Ethernet header. A transfer shorter than an Ethernet header, including a zero-length one, previously became a runt skb passed to netif_rx() and counted as received; it is now counted in rx_length_errors and ends the walk. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98618 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eth: fbnic: Handle maximum standalone channels Standalone channels use one NAPI vector for each Tx and Rx queue. fbnic's allocation path excludes FBNIC_MAX_TXQS from that layout. A 64-Tx/64-Rx configuration therefore records 128 vectors but allocates only 64, leaving NULL entries that resource setup dereferences. Include the maximum vector count in standalone allocation. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98620 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: unregister net_devices in case of probe failure If register_netdev() fails for one of the MTK_MAX_DEVS devices in mtk_probe(), the error path jumps to err_deinit_ppe, skipping mtk_unreg_dev(). The previously registered net_devices are then freed by mtk_free_dev() while still in NETREG_REGISTERED state, hitting the BUG_ON(dev->reg_state != NETREG_UNREGISTERED). Route the register_netdev() failure to err_unreg_netdev so the net_devices registered so far are properly unregistered before being freed. | ||||