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Search Results (410800 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-98576 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 5.3 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: llcp: fix slab-out-of-bounds reads when logging service names nfc_llcp_wks_sap() and nfc_llcp_build_sdreq_tlv() pass non-null- terminated strings to pr_debug() using the %s format specifier. The buffers are allocated via kmemdup() or come from netlink attributes and are not guaranteed to be null-terminated, causing __dynamic_pr_debug() to read beyond the allocated region: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in __dynamic_pr_debug Fix both call sites by using %.*s with the explicit length to limit the output to the actual length of the string. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98575 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 6.2 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: pn533: fix OOB read in pn533_acr122_is_rx_frame_valid() frame->ccid.datalen is read directly from the USB response frame and used, unchecked, as an index into frame->data[]. A malicious or malfunctioning device can set this field to an arbitrary value, causing the driver to read far outside the received buffer. Bound ccid.datalen against the maximum possible ACR122 frame size before using it. This replaces the existing datalen == 0 check, since datalen < 2 already covers that case and additionally rejects datalen == 1, which would still underflow the "datalen - 2" offset used below. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98573 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: skbuff: fix pull-bound underflow in skb_checksum_setup_ipv6() skb_maybe_pull_tail() subtracts skb_headlen(skb) from the unsigned max argument and passes the result to __pskb_pull_tail() as a signed int. The function does not ensure that max is at least skb_headlen(skb). This can happen while parsing IPv6 extension headers when an skb already has a linear area larger than MAX_IPV6_HDR_LEN. Once the parser needs data beyond the linear area, max - skb_headlen(skb) wraps and is converted to a negative delta. __pskb_pull_tail() then passes that negative length to skb_copy_bits(), where it can become a very large copy length. Pass the requested length itself as the pull bound at the three extension-header call sites, so the delta can no longer go negative. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98572 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 4.4 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix immediate JMP JEQ/JNE on MIPS32 An addu instruction was emitted instead of addiu, causing the immediate value 1 to be interpreted as register $at. This made the comparison result invalid when the immediate operand was negative. Note that $at is mapped to BPF_REG_AX, which is used for constant blinding. Fix the instruction to use the immediate form. Found with test_bpf on MIPS32r1 emulated by QEMU. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98571 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 5.9 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: stmmac: clear stale buf->page after recycling on skb build failure In stmmac_rx(), when napi_build_skb() fails the descriptor page is recycled back to the page pool with page_pool_recycle_direct(), but buf->page is left pointing at the recycled page, unlike every other consumption site in the function which clears the pointer after handing the page away. With the stale pointer stmmac_rx_refill() skips the replacement allocation and programs the already-recycled page back into the RX descriptor. Clear buf->page on the napi_build_skb() failure path to keep the buffer lifecycle consistent with the other consumption sites. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98570 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 5.9 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ipv6: keep room for the mac header in dst_dev_overhead() The seg6, ioam6 and rpl lwtunnels size their skb_cow_head() request as the length they are about to push plus dst_dev_overhead(), then push the new headers and rebuild the mac header below them with skb_mac_header_rebuild(). That rebuild needs skb->mac_len of headroom, but dst_dev_overhead() leaves LL_RESERVED_SPACE() of the egress device, 16 bytes for plain Ethernet. Where the mac header is longer than that, as it is on ingress through a VLAN device with reorder_hdr off, the rebuild runs out of room: skb_set_mac_header(skb, -skb->mac_len) computes a negative offset, stores it unchecked in the u16 skb->mac_header, and the memmove that follows writes skb->mac_len bytes about 64 KB past skb->head. Forwarding plain ping6 traffic through such a device reproduces it on all five seg6 encapsulation modes and on the rpl and ioam6 inline paths; skb->mac_header comes back as 65534 on a 704-byte head. Return the larger of the two. The helper already returns skb->mac_len when it has no dst, so this only makes the other branch agree, and it covers every caller rather than each call site in turn. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98560 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 3.3 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: size a connection's path set by the transport it ends up with __rds_conn_create() computes npaths from the caller's transport before it decides whether a connection to one of the host's own addresses is to be handled by the loopback transport instead. That substitution is what an RDS/TCP socket sending to a local address gets, and after it the path init loop still runs for the TCP transport's RDS_MPATH_WORKERS paths and allocates an ordered workqueue for each, while rds_loop_conn_alloc() only ever provides transport data for path 0. rds_conn_destroy() sizes its teardown from c_trans, by then the loopback transport, so it visits path 0 only - and rds_conn_path_destroy() would skip the other paths anyway, since it returns before destroy_workqueue() for a path without transport data. kfree(c_path) then drops the last pointers to seven workqueues. That repeats for every such connection, on every netns teardown or module unload, and every distinct local destination address is a separate connection. Recompute npaths once the transport is final, so that creation and destruction agree on the set of paths. The c_path array stays sized for the caller's transport; the unused entries are freed with it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98558 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 4.1 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: flush skb_defer_nodes in dev_cpu_dead() When a CPU goes offline, dev_cpu_dead() drains its softnet queues (completion_queue, output_queue, poll_list, process_queue, and input_pkt_queue), but leaves net_hotdata.skb_defer_nodes untouched. If oldcpu goes offline while holding pending skbs in its skb_defer_nodes lists (e.g. below the sysctl_skb_defer_max >> 1 IPI threshold, or if the IPI races with CPU teardown), those skbs remain stranded until oldcpu is brought back online. If any of these skbs hold page_pool fragments, page_pool_destroy() will stall indefinitely waiting for inflight pages to be returned when a netdev or driver is torn down while oldcpu is offline. Additionally, if smp_call_function_single_async() fails in kick_defer_list_purge() because the target CPU went offline, reset defer_ipi_scheduled to 0 so future IPI kicks are not blocked when the CPU comes back online. Also, if oldcpu was the last online CPU on its NUMA node, drain that node's slot across all CPUs so no skbs deferred from that node remain stranded on idle remote CPUs (or if the node itself is subsequently offlined). Finally, in skb_attempt_defer_free(), re-check cpu_online(cpu) and whether the caller migrated CPUs after llist_add(), flushing the node list if so, to close the preemption TOCTOU race against CPU/node teardown. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98557 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gve: DQO: fix header length used by gve_can_send_tso() for UDP GSO gve_can_send_tso() computes how many buffers each segment of a GSO packet would span, and for this it needs the length of the headers that the device replicates in front of every segment. It unconditionally uses skb_tcp_all_headers(), which reads the doff field of the TCP header. SKB_GSO_UDP_L4 packets have no TCP header: tcp_hdrlen() then reads one byte of the UDP payload, and header_len can be anything in [0, 60] instead of the transport offset plus the eight bytes of the UDP header that gve_prep_tso() programs into the TSO context descriptor. A wrong header length shifts all the segment boundaries computed in the loop, so the number of buffers per segment can be over or under estimated. In the first case, GSO is needlessly disabled for this packet by gve_features_check_dqo() and the stack has to segment it. In the second case, the driver hands the device a packet whose segments span more than GVE_TX_MAX_DATA_DESCS buffers. Use the UDP header length for SKB_GSO_UDP_L4 packets, matching what gve_prep_tso() does. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98556 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gve: DQO: reject TSO packets with an out of range MSS gve_prep_tso() notes that the device requires the MSS to be <= 9728, but does not enforce it, assuming the 9K MTU enforced by the hypervisor and the 64KB limit on TSO sizes are enough. This does not hold for packets that were not generated locally. A guest behind a tap, or any packet socket user, can provide an arbitrary gso_size in virtio_net_hdr. Layer 2 forwarding does not check the MTU for GSO packets (is_skb_forwardable()), and gso_features_check() only bounds skb->len and gso_segs, never gso_size. Such a packet reaches gve_tx_fill_tso_ctx_desc(), which puts gso_size into the mss field of the TSO context descriptor. This field is 14 bits wide, so a gso_size of 16384 is silently turned into an MSS of zero. Drop these packets from gve_prep_tso(), and make sure that gve_features_check_dqo() leaves their GSO bits alone: skb_segment() splits at gso_size regardless of the MTU, so falling back to software segmentation would give the device non TSO packets bigger than the 9728 bytes it supports. Note that the device can still be given oversized non TSO packets when the stack segments in software for other reasons, for instance after TSO has been disabled with ethtool. This is a generic issue, because the MTU check is skipped for GSO packets in the forwarding path, and is addressed separately. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98555 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: llc: fix skb UAF and leaks on llc_mac_hdr_init() failure In llc_conn_ac_resend_i_xxx_x_set_0_or_send_rr(), if llc_mac_hdr_init() fails, kfree_skb(skb) is called instead of kfree_skb(nskb). This leaks the newly allocated nskb, reads from the freed skb via LLC_I_GET_NR(pdu), and double-frees skb when llc_conn_state_process() drops its reference. In llc_sap_action_send_xid_r() and llc_sap_action_send_test_r(), nskb is leaked if llc_mac_hdr_init() returns an error. Free nskb in all three error paths. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98554 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vlan: ensure sufficient headroom in vlan_dev_hard_header() Callers that only reserve ETH_HLEN or less (such as llc_alloc_frame()), or skbs allocated before dynamic device/headroom changes (e.g. toggling VLAN_FLAG_REORDER_HDR or bonding/team switching slaves), can reach vlan_dev_hard_header() with insufficient headroom and trigger skb_under_panic(). Use skb_cow_head() in vlan_dev_hard_header() when VLAN_FLAG_REORDER_HDR is not set to ensure sufficient headroom for the VLAN header(s) and the underlying device hard header. Use READ_ONCE() to read dev->hard_header_len and dev->needed_headroom as they can be updated concurrently under RTNL (e.g. in vlan_transfer_features()) while vlan_dev_hard_header() runs locklessly on the transmit path. Also avoid LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev) here so that the extra HH_DATA_MOD alignment padding does not trigger unnecessary pskb_expand_head() reallocations on inner stacked VLAN devices after the outer VLAN header has been pushed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98553 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 2.3 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: autofs: fix sbi->pipe file reference leak in autofs_kill_sb() When autofs_fill_super() fails before clearing AUTOFS_SBI_CATATONIC (for example, when find_get_pid() fails on an invalid pgrp mount option, or when an fs_context is closed before mounting), deactivate_locked_super() invokes autofs_kill_sb() -> autofs_catatonic_mode(sbi). Because AUTOFS_SBI_CATATONIC is still set in sbi->flags, autofs_catatonic_mode() returns early without calling fput(sbi->pipe), permanently leaking the pipe struct file reference. Explicitly release sbi->pipe in autofs_kill_sb() if it is still non-NULL after autofs_catatonic_mode(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-98552 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 2.5 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/core: Fix a refcount leak in attach_perf_ctx_data() The attach_perf_ctx_data() can race on global and !global cases. The global case is protected by global_ctx_data_rwsem and shares a single reference count using perf_ctx_data.global field. But when it races with !global case, it may miss to set the global field and result in a reference count leak. CPU1 CPU2 ---------------------------------------------------------------- attach_task_ctx_data(.global=1) attach_task_ctx_data(.global=0) cd1 = alloc_perf_ctx_data(); cd2 = alloc_perf_ctx_data(); // { .global = 0, .refcount = 1 }; try_cmpxchg(); // success, // task->perf_ctx_data = cd2 try_cmpxhg(); // fail; old = cd2 refcount_inc_not_zero(&old->refcount); // success // old.refcount = 2 free_perf_ctx_data(cd1); Then later detach_global_ctx_data() will see the data but it's not marked as global, so it won't call detach_task_ctx_data(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-98551 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 3.3 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/core: Fill branch entries with a single assignment perf_clear_branch_entry_bitfields() clears the bitfields of struct perf_branch_entry one by one and leaves from/to alone, since callers overwrite those straight away. The list has to be kept in sync with the struct by hand and has already fallen behind: new_type and priv were added to perf_branch_entry and never added here. Only BRBE writes those two, and neither for every record. brbe_set_perf_entry_type() leaves new_type alone for a branch type it does not recognise, and priv is not set for source-only records. arm_pmuv3.c allocates the per-CPU branch stack with kmalloc(), so such a record reaches userspace with whatever the slot held: uninitialised kmalloc() data on the first pass over the buffer, the previous record's values after that. Nothing under arch/x86/events/ writes either field, so only arm64 is affected. Assign the whole entry at each site instead. Everything not named is then zero, and there is no list to keep in sync. The bitfields add up to exactly 64 bits, so the struct has no padding to leave undefined. perf_clear_branch_entry_bitfields() has no callers left, so remove it. perf_entry_from_brbe_regset() assigns an empty literal instead, since it fills from/to conditionally. PERF_BR_SPEC_NA is 0, so dropping the explicit spec assignment changes nothing. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98550 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: reject invalid and unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG to prevent bc_ackers underflow Commit 48a5fe38772b ("tipc: fix bc_ackers underflow on duplicate GRP_ACK_MSG") rejected duplicate/stale ACKs in tipc_group_proto_rcv() by returning early when less_eq(acked, m->bc_acked). However, that check remains incomplete in two ways: 1. When grp->bc_ackers is zero (e.g. on a quiet group, when replicast ACKs were not requested, or after all expected members have already acknowledged), an unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG with acked > m->bc_acked passes less_eq() and unconditionally decrements grp->bc_ackers. Because bc_ackers is a u16, this wraps to 65535, causing tipc_group_bc_cong() to permanently report congestion and blocking all future group broadcasts on the socket. 2. During an active broadcast round (grp->bc_ackers > 0), the sender transmits packet S and advances grp->bc_snd_nxt to S + 1. Receivers increment their expected counter to S + 1 upon consuming packet S, so the only valid ACK value for the current round is strictly acked == grp->bc_snd_nxt. However, tipc_group_update_bc_members() initializes each member's m->bc_acked to prev = grp->bc_snd_nxt - 1 (S - 1 before increment). This leaves a 2-sequence gap (S - 1 to S + 1) in sequence space. An incoming ACK is therefore neither rejected as duplicate nor prevented from decrementing grp->bc_ackers if an unexpected or stale value (such as S) is received. A member sending acked = S followed by acked = S + 1 could decrement grp->bc_ackers twice in the same round, prematurely clearing bc_ackers or underflowing it. Fix this by: - Dropping GRP_ACK_MSG immediately if grp->bc_ackers is zero. - Requiring acked == grp->bc_snd_nxt and rejecting duplicates where m->bc_acked == acked. Because replicast broadcast rounds are strictly sequential, only grp->bc_snd_nxt can be acknowledged, and each member can acknowledge at most once per round. Note that a related pre-existing issue in tipc_group_delete_member() (where grp->bc_ackers decrementing to zero upon member departure does not restore *grp->open or trigger a socket wakeup) will be addressed in a separate patch. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98549 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 4.8 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: prevent collapsing skbs across boundary in rtx queue tcp_write_collapse_fence() sets TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->eor = 1 on tcp_write_queue_tail(sk) to prevent skbs queued after a switch to device encryption from being collapsed into earlier skbs. The fence is a no-op if all earlier data has already been transmitted when the switch happens: sk->sk_write_queue is empty. The not yet acknowledged earlier skbs wait in sk->tcp_rtx_queue with eor 0. On a subsequent retransmit or SACK shift, tcp_retrans_try_collapse() or tcp_shift_skb_data() can then merge an skb queued after the switch into one queued before it. Both users of the fence are affected: - psp: devices only encrypt skbs with skb->decrypted set. The merged skb keeps decrypted = 0 from the earlier skb, so merged data sent after psp_sock_assoc_set_tx() is retransmitted in cleartext. - tls device offload: the merged skb straddles the start marker set in tls_set_device_offload(). The software fallback (fill_sg_in() returns -EINVAL) and the mlx5, nfp and funeth drivers cannot handle such an skb and drop it. Every retransmit rebuilds the same skb, so the connection stalls. Fix this in two places, for defense in depth: 1. Fall back to tcp_rtx_queue_tail(sk) in tcp_write_collapse_fence() when tcp_write_queue_tail(sk) is NULL. 2. Check !skb_cmp_decrypted(to, from) in tcp_skb_can_collapse(), as tcp_skb_can_collapse_rx() does on receive. skb_shift(), which both collapse paths call, already has a DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE() for this condition. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98548 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: discard the rest of the packet on a stale-cookie error When an association is in COOKIE-ECHOED state and the peer sends a bundled [ERROR(Stale Cookie)][DATA] packet from one of its non-primary addresses, processing the ERROR chunk takes the non-fatal stale-cookie retry path sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which queues SCTP_CMD_DEL_NON_PRIMARY while keeping the association alive. sctp_cmd_del_non_primary() removes every non-primary transport - including the very transport this packet arrived on, which is still referenced by the receive lookup and shared by all chunks of the packet via chunk->transport. sctp_assoc_rm_peer() does redirect asoc->peer.last_data_from away from the removed transport, but right afterwards the bundled DATA chunk makes sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() re-register asoc->peer.last_data_from = chunk->transport unconditionally, undoing the redirection with the just-removed transport. Once the packet is done, the receive reference is dropped and the transport is RCU-freed, while the surviving association keeps the dangling last_data_from. A later FWD-TSN (or the delayed SACK timer) makes sctp_gen_sack() dereference it (->param_flags and friends), and sctp_make_sack()/sctp_outq_select_transport() may write to the freed object and link it into the live transport list. This is a use-after-free triggerable by any malicious SCTP peer (or a local unprivileged user acting as one) with no capabilities required: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sctp_do_sm+0x498a/0x5660 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88800e1e356c by task poc/115 Call Trace: sctp_do_sm <- sctp_assoc_bh_rcv <- sctp_inq_push <- sctp_rcv <- ip_protocol_deliver_rcu <- ip_rcv Allocated: sctp_transport_new <- sctp_assoc_add_peer <- sctp_process_init (INIT-ACK processing) Freed: kfree <- sctp_transport_destroy_rcu <- rcu_core (call_rcu queued by sctp_transport_put at end of sctp_rcv) The buggy address is located 364 bytes inside of freed 1024-byte region [ffff88800e1e3400, ffff88800e1e3800), cache kmalloc-1k Note that commit 03a9d10ecf71 ("sctp: drop a chunk if its transport was removed") only covers the window between the receive lookup and the chunk processing (e.g. an ASCONF DEL-IP racing the socket backlog); here the transport is removed *while* the packet is being processed, by an earlier chunk of the same packet, so the drop in sctp_inq_push() does not reach this path. Verified with the bundled [ERROR(Stale Cookie)][DATA] + FWD-TSN reproducer: the KASAN report above still fires with that commit applied, and is gone with this patch on top. Fix it by discarding the rest of the packet on this path, as suggested by Xin. After the stale-cookie ERROR has sent the association back to COOKIE-WAIT and removed the non-primary transports, the remaining chunks of the packet can only run against the restarted handshake while referencing the removed arrival transport through chunk->transport: besides the last_data_from registration above, sctp_cmd_setup_t2() and the sctp_make_*() reply builders would also copy that pointer into association-lifetime state that sctp_assoc_rm_peer() has already sanitized. Let the peer retransmit them, in line with what sctp_inq_push() does for chunks whose transport was removed before processing. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98544 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 4.1 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bna: prevent IOC timer rearm during teardown bna: prevent IOC timer rearm during teardown bnad_pci_remove() and the probe disable_ioceth path call timer_delete_sync() for ioc_timer, sem_timer and hb_timer, but not for iocpf_timer. bnad_iocpf_timeout() then takes bnad->bna_lock after free_netdev() has freed the struct bnad. Deleting iocpf_timer last does not fix this. sem_timer and iocpf_timer rearm each other: bnad_iocpf_sem_timeout() can arm iocpf_timer, and bnad_iocpf_timeout() arms sem_timer from bfa_ioc_hw_sem_get() when the semaphore is busy. timer_delete_sync() only waits out its own callback. bnad_ioceth_disable() can time out and leave that callback live. Shut all four IOC timers down with timer_shutdown_sync() on both paths, so a later mod_timer() is ignored. This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98543 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 4.1 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: fs/xattr: don't assume the inode is locked in path_unlink/path_rmdir bpf_lsm_has_d_inode_locked() makes the verifier rewrite bpf_[set|remove]_dentry_xattr() to the _locked variants, which assume that the caller already holds the inode's i_rwsem. The path_unlink and path_rmdir hooks are listed, but security_path_unlink() and security_path_rmdir() run before vfs_unlink()/vfs_rmdir() take the victim inode's i_rwsem, so a sleepable BPF LSM program attached to either hook mutates the victim's xattrs without the lock held. Drop the two path hooks from d_inode_locked_hooks so that the verifier keeps the locking bpf_[set|remove]_dentry_xattr() variants, which take the lock themselves. | ||||