| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Parsing a multipart form can bypass memory limits and read an arbitrarily long line into memory when the remaining limit at the start of a part is less than 400 bytes. |
| Historically, we have been rather lax about malformed framing-related headers in our HTTP/2 implementation, as they cannot interfere with HTTP/2 framing. However, this makes it possible for our HTTP/2 implementation to forward responses containing such headers to an HTTP/1 client when acting as a reverse proxy. If the HTTP/1 client also does not behave strictly enough, this can result in response smuggling. |
| When "Trailer" headers are sent by a client, the HTTP server internally uses the header values to populate the Request.Trailer map passed to the server handler. Because Request.Trailer is a map, each entry incurs memory overhead. For HTTP/2 servers, a malicious client can exploit this by sending a "Trailer" header that declares a large number of fields, causing the server to allocate a disproportionate amount of memory while bypassing Server.MaxHeaderValueCount and Server.MaxHeaderBytes limits. This exploit is not applicable for HTTP/1 servers, which do not support multiplexing a large number of requests over one TCP connection, and whose Server.MaxHeaderBytes are calculated differently. |
| When an HTTP server handler sends a 2xx response to an HTTP/1 CONNECT request and returns without hijacking the connection, the server improperly continues to read and serve requests from the connection. Since a 2xx response to an HTTP/1 CONNECT converts the connection into a tunnel, the server should not treat the connection as continuing to contain HTTP. The impact of this misbehavior is mostly limited to potential request smuggling, where an intermediate proxy considers the data on the connection to be tunneled and the server considers it to be HTTP. |
| A malicious HTTP/2 peer can cause excessive CPU consumption in the client or server by opening a large number of streams and then sending many small SETTINGS frames containing SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE values. |
| When parsing a Range header containing a large number of small ranges, FileServer(FS), ServeContent, and ServeFile(FS) can consume an excessive amount of CPU. |
| The HTTP/2 server can refund connection-level flow control twice for the same data: Once when a client resets a stream (refunding data for any sent-but-unread portion of the stream), and again when a request handler reads the buffered data. A malicious client can exploit this to bypass the configured connection-level flow control limit (MaxReceiveBufferPerConnection). Total buffered data is still limited by the concurrent stream limit and stream-level flow control. |
| When http.Transport sends an HTTP/1 CONNECT request with a non-empty Request.Body, it writes the body directly to the connection without framing after the request headers. If the server rejects the CONNECT request with a non-2xx keep-alive response, Transport returns the connection to the idle pool. Because CONNECT requests do not have a request body, the server may interpret the trailing body bytes as a subsequent pipelined HTTP/1.1 request on the connection, leaving the pooled connection desynchronized and causing the next caller that reuses it to read the response to the injected request. In reverse proxies (including httputil.ReverseProxy) that forward CONNECT requests through a shared Transport, this can lead to cross-user response poisoning. |
| HTTP/2 servers could end up crashing due to inadvertently modifying its HPACK encoder concurrently. This happens because the server modifies the HPACK encoder from two goroutines without synchronization: one uses the encoder to encode a HEADERS frame as part of a response sent to a client and the other modifies the encoder's table size when handling a SETTINGS frame containing SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE that a client sends. A malicious client can repeatedly send a request while changing the header table size to crash the server. |
| Pathological inputs could cause DoS through consumePhrase when parsing an email address according to RFC 5322. |
| Well-crafted inputs reaching ParseAddress, ParseAddressList, and ParseDate were able to trigger excessive CPU exhaustion and memory allocations. |
| url.Parse insufficiently validated the host/authority component and accepted some invalid URLs. |
| When processing HTTP/2 SETTINGS frames, transport will enter an infinite loop of writing CONTINUATION frames if it receives a SETTINGS_MAX_FRAME_SIZE with a value of 0. |
| When using LookupCNAME with the cgo DNS resolver, a very long CNAME response can trigger a double-free of C memory and a crash. |
| The net/url package does not set a limit on the number of query parameters in a query. While the maximum size of query parameters in URLs is generally limited by the maximum request header size, the net/http.Request.ParseForm method can parse large URL-encoded forms. Parsing a large form containing many unique query parameters can cause excessive memory consumption. |
| Previously, resolving relative paths containing parent directory ('..') segments performed string conversions and buffer rewrites on each step, resulting in quadratic time complexity and high memory allocation overhead. Now, path resolution operates on a byte buffer using index-based backtracking for '..' segments, eliminating the quadratic time complexity and significantly reducing memory allocations. |
| When a server is configured to support unencrypted HTTP/2, it reads a few bytes from each new connection to see if they contain the HTTP/2 client preface. ReadHeaderTimeout is unexpectedly not being applied when doing this. |
| ReverseProxy can forward queries containing parameters not visible to Rewrite functions. When used with a Rewrite function, or a Director function which parses query parameters, ReverseProxy sanitizes the forwarded request to remove query parameters which are not parsed by url.ParseQuery. ReverseProxy does not take ParseQuery's limit on the total number of query parameters (controlled by GODEBUG=urlmaxqueryparams=N) into account. This can permit ReverseProxy to forward a request containing a query parameter that is not visible to the Rewrite function. For example, the query "a1=x&a2=x&...&a10000=x&hidden=y" can forward the parameter "hidden=y" while hiding it from the proxy's Rewrite function. |
| The Dial and LookupPort functions panic on Windows when provided with an input containing a NUL (0). |
| Due to missing nil check, sending 0x0a-0x0f HTTP/2 frames will cause a running server to panic |
