| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vhost-vdpa: protect config_ctx from being freed under the config callback
vhost_vdpa_config_cb() loads v->config_ctx and signals it without taking
a reference and without holding any lock:
struct eventfd_ctx *config_ctx = v->config_ctx;
if (config_ctx)
eventfd_signal(config_ctx);
VHOST_VDPA_SET_CONFIG_CALL replaces that field and drops what is normally
the last reference to the old context:
swap(ctx, v->config_ctx);
if (ctx)
eventfd_ctx_put(ctx);
eventfd_ctx_put() drops the last kref and frees the context immediately,
with no RCU grace period, so a callback that has already loaded the
pointer goes on to dereference freed memory. The two sides share no
lock: the ioctl runs under vhost_dev.mutex, while the parent invokes the
callback from its own interrupt or workqueue context.
This is not the reopen refcount underflow fixed by commit f6bbf0010ba0
("vhost-vdpa: fix use-after-free of v->config_ctx"), which was about
vhost_vdpa_config_put() leaving a stale pointer behind. Here the pointer
is maintained correctly and it is the read side that is unprotected.
With VDUSE as the parent this is reachable from userspace with access to
/dev/vduse (root by default). VDUSE_DEV_INJECT_CONFIG_IRQ queues
dev->inject, and vduse_dev_irq_inject() runs the callback under VDUSE's
own dev->irq_lock, which vhost does not hold. vduse_dev_reset() does
flush_work(&dev->inject), but VHOST_VDPA_SET_CONFIG_CALL never goes
through reset, so an inject already in flight is not waited for. A
process that injects config interrupts on the VDUSE fd while another
thread swaps the call fd on the vhost-vdpa fd hits it in seconds:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888107d21808 by task kworker/u17:1/2993
Workqueue: vduse-irq vduse_dev_irq_inject
Call Trace:
native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x97/0x5b0
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd4/0xe0
eventfd_signal_mask+0x69/0x120
vhost_vdpa_config_cb+0x34/0x50
vduse_dev_irq_inject+0x46/0x60
process_one_work+0x468/0x950
Allocated by task 2992:
do_eventfd+0x50/0x200
__x64_sys_eventfd2+0x2e/0x40
Freed by task 2992:
eventfd_ctx_put+0xb9/0xc0
vhost_vdpa_unlocked_ioctl+0x116c/0x2190
Add a spinlock covering every access to config_ctx, so the callback
either signals a context that is still alive or observes NULL, and the
put happens only once no callback can reach the old value.
Clearing the parent's callback before the put would not be enough: of the
in-tree set_config_cb() implementations only VDUSE takes a lock, the rest
store the pointer unlocked, so that would not order against an in-flight
invocation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vduse: validate virtqueue alignment
vduse_validate_config() only checks the upper bound of vq_align. Invalid
values can therefore reach vring_create_virtqueue_map(). The split-ring
helpers use align - 1 as a bit mask, so the alignment must be a non-zero
power of two. A zero value makes vring_size() drop the descriptor and
available-ring part and vring_init() leave the used ring pointer NULL.
The VIRTIO spec requires the used ring to start at an address
aligned to at least 4 bytes. Reject values below VRING_USED_ALIGN_SIZE as
well as non-power-of-two values before they reach the virtio ring helpers.
Opening a virtio-net device created with vq_align=0 triggered:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in virtqueue_kick_prepare_split+0xe3/0x100
Read of size 2 at addr 0000000000000000 by task systemd-network/1062
Call Trace (relevant frames):
dump_stack_lvl
print_report
kasan_report
__asan_load2
virtqueue_kick_prepare_split+0xe3/0x100
virtqueue_kick_prepare+0x40/0x60
try_fill_recv+0x857/0x1250
virtnet_open+0x189/0x460
__dev_open+0x225/0x390
__dev_change_flags+0x368/0x3b0
netif_change_flags+0x56/0xc0
do_setlink.isra.0+0x68c/0x1e30
Validate the value before it reaches the virtio ring helpers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vhost: invalidate vring access on IOTLB transitions
When VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM changes, cached vring pointers and IOTLB
metadata are interpreted in a different address space. Keeping them
across the transition can leave stale ring mappings in use.
Clearing d->iotlb before taking the VQ locks also lets a worker observe
a transient NULL d->iotlb and fall back to d->umem while translating a
descriptor.
Add a common vhost_clear_device_iotlb() helper for vhost-net and
vhost-vsock. Take all VQ mutexes in index order before dropping the
device-wide IOTLB, invalidate each VQ's cached ring access and metadata,
clear pending IOTLB messages, and free the old table after the handoff.
This serializes the transition with workers and prevents mixed address
space mappings.
On the first direct-to-IOTLB transition, invalidate the cached vring
addresses. When an existing device IOTLB is replaced, preserve the
GIOVA ring addresses and reset only the metadata cache. After clearing
ACCESS_PLATFORM, userspace must configure the vring addresses for the
new address mode.
vhost_vq_invalidate_access() clears desc, avail, and used together.
Treat the VQ as invalidated only when all three are NULL, since a single
GIOVA address may legitimately be zero. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Update last skb marker in manage_oob().
Fahad Alharbi reported that blocking recv(MSG_PEEK) could hog CPU
due to OOB skb.
In the following cases, manage_oob() skips OOB skb(s) and returns
NULL for the last recv(MSG_PEEK):
socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sk);
1) skb -> OOB skb -> NULL
send(sk[0], "ab", 2, MSG_OOB);
recv(sk[1], buf, 0, MSG_PEEK);
2) skb -> consumed OOB skb -> NULL
send(sk[0], "ab", 2, MSG_OOB);
recv(sk[1], buf, 1, MSG_OOB);
recv(sk[1], buf, 0, MSG_PEEK);
3) consumed OOB skb -> OOB skb -> NULL
send(sk[0], "a", 1, MSG_OOB);
recv(sk[1], buf, 0, MSG_OOB);
send(sk[0], "b", 1, MSG_OOB);
recv(sk[1], buf, 1, MSG_PEEK);
Then, @copied is 0 in unix_stream_read_generic() (zero-length buffer,
or non-OOB skb is not yet consumed), and unix_stream_data_wait() is
called.
However, it returns immediately because @last is not updated in
unix_stream_read_generic(), and the thread busy-waits for a new skb.
Let's update @last in manage_oob().
For MSG_PEEK, @last is updated with the skipped OOB, and for the
non-peek case, @last matches the returned value (when !copied)
because OOB is unlinked.
Note that manage_oob() is inlined and no stack canary is added. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: ice: don't dereference pointers from TP_printk()
After forwarding net-next during the v7.3 merge window we started
seeing:
TRACE EVENT ERROR: Event ice_tx_dim_work has double dereference in TP_printk: REC->q_vector->tx.tx_ring->q_index
WARNING: kernel/trace/trace_events.c:420 at test_double_dereference.cold+0x39/0x4b
this is due to extra checks added in tracing subsystem in
commit b5cc230af5e5 ("tracing: Warn when an event dereferences a pointer in TP_printk()").
Printing happens long after the event was recorded, by which point
the pointers may be invalid (the ring or the dim instance).
Copy the eight scalars into the event instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sysfs: Fix NULL pointer dereference in device_del()
A NULL pointer dereference in klist_put() occurs when a child device (such
as a BNEP network device in bnep_session) is concurrently being
unregistered while hci_conn_del_sysfs() reparents child devices.
This is caused by a race condition between hci_conn_del_sysfs() and
concurrent child device unregistration (e.g. bnep_session calling
unregister_netdev()). During device unregistration, device_del() snapshots
a non-NULL parent pointer. Concurrently, hci_conn_del_sysfs() finds the
child device using device_find_any_child() and calls device_move() to
reparent it to NULL, which removes the node from its parent's klist and
clears knode_parent. Subsequently, device_del() calls
klist_del(&dev->p->knode_parent) using the stale parent snapshot, causing
klist_put() to dereference knode_klist(n)->put on an already removed node,
resulting in a NULL pointer dereference.
This race was introduced by commit 27aabf27fd01 ("Bluetooth: fix
use-after-free in device_for_each_child()"), which replaced
device_find_child(..., __match_tty) with device_find_any_child() in
hci_conn_del_sysfs(). That change was intended to avoid a use-after-free
where conn->dev outlived its parent hdev->dev when child devices held
references to conn->dev, because conn->dev only held a reference to
hdev->dev while registered in sysfs.
Fix the issue properly by taking an explicit reference to the parent device
with get_device(&hdev->dev) in hci_conn_init_sysfs() and dropping it with
put_device(parent) in bt_link_release() when the conn device is freed. This
ensures that hdev->dev remains valid for the entire lifecycle of conn->dev,
resolving the underlying use-after-free. With the parent reference held
properly, restore the __match_tty filter in hci_conn_del_sysfs() so that
device_move() is only invoked on persistent RFCOMM TTY devices as
originally intended, eliminating the race condition with unregistering
network devices. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: initialize _md in vxlan_xmit_one()
If a VXLAN device is configured with both VXLAN_F_COLLECT_METADATA and
VXLAN_F_GBP, and a packet is transmitted through it using an external
ip_tunnel_info that lacks the IP_TUNNEL_VXLAN_OPT_BIT flag, md is left
pointing to the uninitialized _md stack variable:
if (test_bit(IP_TUNNEL_VXLAN_OPT_BIT, info->key.tun_flags)) {
if (info->options_len < sizeof(*md))
goto drop;
md = ip_tunnel_info_opts(info);
}
Because IP_TUNNEL_VXLAN_OPT_BIT is not set, md is not updated and remains
pointing to _md. Later, vxlan_build_skb() is called with md, which
eventually calls vxlan_build_gbp_hdr():
if (vxflags & VXLAN_F_GBP)
vxlan_build_gbp_hdr(vxh, md);
Inside vxlan_build_gbp_hdr(), md->gbp is read:
if (!md->gbp)
return;
gbp = (struct vxlanhdr_gbp *)vxh;
...
if (md->gbp & VXLAN_GBP_DONT_LEARN)
gbp->dont_learn = 1;
If the stack contains garbage, this causes:
1) VXLAN_HF_GBP flag to be spuriously set in the VXLAN header.
2) gbp->dont_learn and gbp->policy_applied to be set from stack bits.
3) gbp->policy_id to receive 16 bits of uninitialized kernel stack data,
leaking it onto the wire.
Fix this by zero-initializing _md. If IP_TUNNEL_VXLAN_OPT_BIT is not
present, md->gbp remains 0, and vxlan_build_gbp_hdr() returns early
without modifying the VXLAN header. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Move representor vnic reporter to eswitch devlink port
The representor vnic devlink health reporter is created and destroyed
along the representor netdev (un)load path, which is not serialized by
the devlink instance lock. Destroying the reporter from there triggers
a devl_assert_locked() splat on driver unbind:
WARNING: net/devlink/core.c:259 at devl_assert_locked+0x54/0x70, CPU#2: bash/3758
Modules linked in: mlx5_vdpa vringh vdpa mlx5_ib mlx5_fwctl mlx5_core ...
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 3758 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 6.19.0+ #1 PREEMPT
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), ...
RIP: 0010:devl_assert_locked+0x54/0x70
Call Trace:
<TASK>
devl_health_reporter_destroy+0x3a/0x1b0
mlx5e_vport_rep_unload+0x12d/0x2b0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_eswitch_unregister_vport_reps+0x1b8/0x220 [mlx5_core]
? __esw_offloads_unload_rep+0x190/0x190 [mlx5_core]
? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xc3/0xf0
device_release_driver_internal+0x3b2/0x560
unbind_store+0xce/0xf0
Move the reporter's lifecycle to the eswitch devlink port (un)register
paths, which are already serialized by the devlink instance lock, and
store the handle on mlx5_devlink_port. Use the port's mlx5_vport as the
reporter priv since the diagnose callback only needs a device handle and
a vport number, and mlx5_vport carries both and is initialized before
any representor driver probes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/core: Allow list_del during perf_event_overflow()
A PMU might use perf_sched_cb_inc() and perf_sched_cb_dec()
interface to get the PMU call back function pmu::sched_task
invoked at schedule in and schedule out. This is achieved
by walking along the list anchored by sched_cb_list.
The following scenario might lead to a list corruption.
perf_pmu_sched_task()
for_each_list_entry(..., &sched_cb_list)
+--> __perf_pmu_sched_task()
+--> event->pmu->sched_task())
+--> PMU_push_sample()
+--> perf_event_overflow()
+--> __perf_event_overflow()
+--> pmu->stop()
+--> perf_sched_cb_dec()
remove entry from sched_cb_list
while list node in use.
This happens when ioctl(fd, PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH, xxx) has been
invoked and perf_event::event_limit hits zero.
Prevent the list corruption and convert for_each_list_entry()
to for_each_list_entry_safe(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/x86/intel: Prevent drain_pebs() reentry
The PEBS buffer is shared by all events on a CPU, so drain_pebs() must
not be reentered. If so, one instance may observe stale buffer state and
potentially access out-of-bound memory.
Most invocations happen in NMI context, which naturally prevents reentry.
However, drain_pebs() is also reachable from process context via
intel_pmu_drain_pebs_buffer().
In those paths, the PMU is often already disabled, but not guaranteed.
For example, __intel_pmu_pebs_disable() only disables the target counter,
so other active counters can still raise a PMI and interrupt an in-flight
drain_pebs(). Here is an example,
__perf_addr_filters_adjust()
perf_event_stop()
__perf_event_stop()
x86_pmu_stop() (event->pmu->stop)
intel_pmu_disable_event()
intel_pmu_pebs_disable()
__intel_pmu_pebs_disable()
intel_pmu_drain_large_pebs()
intel_pmu_drain_pebs_buffer()
Introduce __intel_pmu_quiesce() and __intel_pmu_resume() helpers and
use them in intel_pmu_drain_large_pebs() to disable the full PMU
around the intel_pmu_drain_pebs_buffer() call, preventing reentry.
Also add a warning in intel_pmu_drain_pebs_buffer() when the full PMU is
not disabled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: fix TX descriptor availability check for TSO traffic
stmmac_tso_xmit() estimates the number of free TX descriptors required by
a TSO skb as:
(skb->len - proto_hdr_len) / TSO_MAX_BUFF_SIZE + 1
which assumes the payload is split into TSO_MAX_BUFF_SIZE chunks. This
underestimates the descriptors actually consumed by stmmac_tso_allocator(),
since each fragment is mapped individually and so it needs at least one
descriptor regardless of its size. Moreover, one descriptor is used for
the L2/L3/L4 headers and, when the MSS changes, one more is consumed for
the MSS context descriptor.
For a highly fragmented TSO skb the check can therefore pass even when the
ring has too few free slots. stmmac_tso_allocator() then writes past the
available descriptors, overwriting descriptors still owned by the DMA
engine, corrupting the TX ring.
Add stmmac_tso_get_num_desc() to compute the exact number of descriptors
needed for the header, the linear payload and each fragment, plus the MSS
context descriptor when required, and use it in the availability check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
configfs: pin the symlink target's dirent instead of chasing ->ci_dentry
create_link() reads the target's configfs_dirent from
item->ci_dentry->d_fsdata, relying on the item reference taken by
get_target(). That reference pins the item, not its dentry: the dentry is
pinned by DCACHE_PERSISTENT, which configfs_remove_dir() releases via
simple_rmdir() while the item is still alive. A symlink racing with rmdir
of its target can therefore find ->ci_dentry freed and its dirent
released, triggering WARN_ON(!atomic_read(&sd->s_count)) in configfs_get().
Take the dirent in get_target() as well, under ->d_lock and atomically
with the item reference, and pass it down to create_link(). A hashed
dentry has not been killed yet, so its ->d_fsdata reference keeps the
dirent alive there. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
configfs: unhash the dentry before dropping the item in rmdir
configfs_get_config_item() treats a hashed dentry as proof that
sd->s_element is a live config_item. configfs_rmdir() breaks that:
simple_rmdir() leaves the dentry hashed, the last reference to the item is
dropped right after, and the dentry is only unhashed by d_delete() once
->rmdir() has returned. configfs_symlink() resolves its target holding no
lock on it, so get_target() can land in that window:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in config_item_get+0x26/0x90
get_target fs/configfs/symlink.c:128 [inline]
configfs_symlink+0x4ab/0x1030 fs/configfs/symlink.c:185
Unhash in configfs_remove_dir(), while the item is still guaranteed to be
there. A reference obtained just before that stays harmless, as
create_link() rechecks CONFIGFS_USET_DROPPING, already set by
configfs_detach_prep(). Both configfs_unregister_subsystem() paths
d_drop() after detaching, so this only makes rmdir match them. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipmr: account multicast table and route memory
A netadmin in a user+net namespace can create many IPv4 and IPv6
multicast routing tables with MRT_TABLE and MRT6_TABLE. Each unseen
id allocates an mr_table via the shared mr_table_alloc(), links it
into the per-net list, and leaves it until netns teardown. Those
objects were not charged to memcg, so the host unreclaimable slab
grows with the table count.
Account mr_table allocations with GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT and mark the
IPv4/IPv6 MFC caches SLAB_ACCOUNT. This matches the established
handling of IP addresses, routes and alternate interface names.
Unresolved MFC entries are still allocated from softIRQ with
GFP_ATOMIC and are not charged. They expire after 10 seconds and are
bounded by the socket receive queue; see commit 0079ad8e8dc3
("ipmr: remove hard code cache_resolve_queue_len limit"). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
reboot: fix cad_pid use-after-free race
cad_pid is a single kernel-wide struct pid pointer. proc_do_cad_pid()
reads it and passes it to pid_vnr() without protecting the lifetime of
the referenced struct pid. A concurrent writer can replace cad_pid and
drop the final reference to the old struct pid after the reader has
loaded the pointer but before pid_vnr() has finished dereferencing it,
causing a use-after-free.
kill_cad_pid() has the same lifetime race when it passes cad_pid to
kill_pid().
At the time this issue was reported, an unprivileged user could reach the
sysctl through user and PID namespaces because cad_pid was registered in
pid_table[]. Moving cad_pid back to the global reboot sysctl table
corrected that namespace and permission mismatch, but did not fix the
underlying lifetime race.
Fix this by treating cad_pid as an RCU-protected pointer at both read
sites and by waiting for a grace period before dropping the old reference
on the write side.
call_rcu(&old_pid->rcu, ...) cannot be used here because free_pid()
also queues pid->rcu; queueing the same rcu_head twice can corrupt the
RCU callback list.
Original KASAN crash stack:
kernel/pid.c:545 pid_nr_ns() # reads freed pid->level
kernel/pid.c:556 pid_vnr() # calls pid_nr_ns()
kernel/pid.c:775 proc_do_cad_pid() # calls pid_vnr(cad_pid) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Set the trace clock before registering the histogram trigger
hist_register_trigger() puts the trigger on the global named_triggers
list in cmd_ops->init(), and only then sets the trace clock:
if (data->cmd_ops->init) {
ret = data->cmd_ops->init(data);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
}
if (hist_data->enable_timestamps) {
ret = tracing_set_clock(file->tr, hist_data->attrs->clock);
if (ret) {
hist_err(tr, HIST_ERR_SET_CLOCK_FAIL, errpos(clock));
goto out;
}
The clock string is not checked anywhere before that call, so a named
trigger using common_timestamp with an unknown clock fails after it has
already become findable. event_hist_trigger_parse() then frees it
without taking it off the list, and the next lookup by name reads the
freed object:
~# cd /sys/kernel/tracing/events/sched/sched_switch
~# echo 'hist:name=foo:keys=common_pid:ts=common_timestamp:clock=bogus' > trigger
bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
~# echo 'hist:name=foo:keys=common_pid' > trigger
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in find_named_trigger+0xac/0xc0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800915d760 by task init/1
find_named_trigger+0xac/0xc0
hist_register_trigger+0xc1/0x900
event_hist_trigger_parse+0x3146/0x6af0
event_trigger_write+0xce/0x160
Freed by task 63:
kfree+0x154/0x420
trigger_kthread_fn+0xfd/0x160
Set the clock before the trigger is registered, so that nothing which
can fail runs after it is published, the way commit 6f86bdeab633
("tracing: Fix bad hist from corrupting named_triggers list") moved the
registration below the rest of the setup.
tracing_set_filter_buffering() is reference counted, so the init failure
path has to drop the reference that the clock block now takes first. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Fix memory corruption from a "STACKTRACE" histogram key
"cpu", "CPU", "stacktrace" and "STACKTRACE" are generic fields, defined
with an offset and a size of zero so that the filter code can match them
by name. parse_field() maps them onto their common_* equivalents for
backward compatibility, but unlike the common_* names it hands the
placeholder back to the caller instead of NULL.
create_hist_field() takes a non-NULL field as a promise that the record
carries a stacktrace and picks HIST_FIELD_FN_STACK, so the __data_loc
word is read from offset 0, that is from common_type, and its low 16
bits are followed as an offset into the record. What is found there
becomes the length of an unbounded memcpy. Pick an event whose id is
small enough that the offset stays inside its own record and the length
is a kernel text address:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing
# echo 'hist:keys=STACKTRACE' > events/ftrace/print/trigger
# echo hello > trace_marker
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
RIP: 0010:rb_next+0x23/0x60
</IRQ>
RIP: 0010:memcpy+0xc/0x30
event_hist_trigger+0x2e7/0x12c0
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Leave the field NULL, which is what the comment above the branch says
the code does and what common_stacktrace already does. FILTER_CPU and
FILTER_COMM are left alone, their create_hist_field() branches never
look at the field. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Take trace_array reference when opening a tracer options file
When a tracer option file is opened, it is passed a descriptor that points
to an element on the trace_array's topts array. This element has
information to find the trace array and other information. It uses this
element to take a reference of the trace_array so that the trace_array
does not get removed while this file is opened.
Unfortunately, there's a race condition where the element itself could be
freed by the removal of the instance the trace_array represents causing a
use-after-free as this element that is used to find the trace_array to
increment its reference counter is also freed when the instance is
removed.
To solve this, add a trace_array_tracer_options_get() helper function that
will take the address of the element that is passed to the open function
by the inode->i_private pointer and search all the trace_arrays under a
lock to find the one that the element's address is in the range of the
trace_arrays topts array elements. When a match happens, that trace_array's
reference would be increased.
Note, there's a race where if an admin was deleting and creating trace
instances at the same time and the memory of the old trace_array's array
matched the memory of the new trace_array that it could in theory open the
option from the wrong trace array. But we do not care because it would be
stupid to perform that kind of action. As long as the only thing that can
happen is that the option from the wrong trace array is used and doesn't
crash the kernel it will only make the user confused. But if they are
doing something stupid like this, they are already confused, so no harm
done. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usbusx2y: validate URB actual_length in interrupt callback
i_usx2y_in04_int() processes the interrupt URB data without checking
urb->actual_length. A short transfer from a malfunctioning device
would cause the handler to process uninitialized heap data from the
kmalloc-allocated in04_buf, which is then copied to the mmap-accessible
ctl_snapshot[] array.
Fix by using kzalloc() for in04_buf to zero-initialize the buffer,
and adding an actual_length check to skip processing on short
transfers while still resubmitting the URB. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: skip the VMID 0 flush for VRAM
Clear-on-release only runs on VRAM, which amdgpu_ttm_map_buffer() reaches
via its direct MC address without programming a GART window, yet the wipe
still forces a VMID 0 flush. On GFX11 (e.g. Navi33) that spurious SDMA
flush can wedge the engine; only flush when a GART window is actually used.
v2: Let amdgpu_ttm_map_buffer() return whether the VMID 0 flush is needed,
and drive the clear and copy paths from that. (Christian)
v3: Make the vm_needs_flush output parameter mandatory instead of
allowing NULL. (Christian)
(cherry picked from commit a306e406e570b74318ff7d80e5b07b540ca1d3a9) |
