| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Out of bounds write in Media in Google Chrome prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| In wpas_handle_robust_av_scs_recv_action of robust_av.c, there is a possible out-of-bounds write due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to remote code execution with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| A flaw was found in xorg-x11-server. The server writes pointer barrier events into a fixed-size buffer without properly validating boundaries. An authenticated client can trigger this issue by configuring excessive pointer barriers and generating cursor motion events, causing a buffer overflow. This vulnerability may lead to arbitrary code execution or cause the server to crash, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS). |
| A flaw was found in xorg-x11-server. A local authenticated client can exploit this flaw by sending a crafted input device ungrab request with an unvalidated modifier value. This lack of validation causes the server to perform an out-of-bounds write on the heap, resulting in memory corruption that can lead to a denial of service (DoS) or potential arbitrary code execution. |
| A flaw was found in xorg-x11-server. Due to an integer truncation issue during memory allocation calculations within the X Keyboard Extension (XKB), the server allocates an undersized buffer when resizing key types. An authenticated local client can exploit this vulnerability by sending specially crafted XKB requests, causing a heap-based buffer overflow. This can result in arbitrary code execution or a denial of service (DoS). |
| A flaw was found in xorg-x11-server. In the X Keyboard Extension (XKB), key name memory is allocated with an insufficient buffer size compared to the maximum supported range. An authenticated local client can exploit this flaw by sending requests that modify the keycode range, triggering a heap-based buffer overflow. This vulnerability can lead to arbitrary code execution or cause a Denial of Service (DoS) by crashing the X server. |
| A flaw was found in xorg-x11-server. The X server incorrectly calculates buffer sizes and memory offsets when prepending or appending data to RandR (Resize and Rotate extension) provider properties. A local attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending specially crafted property update requests, causing memory corruption. This flaw could allow an attacker to escalate privileges or cause a denial of service (DoS) by crashing the X server. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: validate absolute native symlink targets before NT fixups
With symlinkroot unset, an absolute target is copied without conversion
to an NT drive path. Later code still assumes an NT prefix is present
when modifying the target and calculating the print name length.
For "/ab", this causes two failures: sym[5] and path[5] are written
past their allocations, and plen -= 2 * poff subtracts an assumed
8-byte prefix from a 6-byte UTF-16 target, wrapping u16 plen to 65534.
That underflow causes another overflow: memcpy() copies 65534 bytes
into a 24-byte buffer. A user with write access to a mounted share
can trigger these bugs with default settings.
Validate the NT drive prefix, including an ASCII drive letter, before
accessing fixed offsets or subtracting the prefix length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/siw: Bound fragmented header copies by the remaining length
siw_get_hdr() can receive an extended DDP/RDMAP header across more than
one TCP callback. The first callback may receive most of the header,
while the next one still limits the copy to hdrlen - MIN_DDP_HDR instead
of the number of missing bytes. This makes the destination move past the
end of the header and overwrite the receive state, including
fpdu_part_rcvd. A later callback can then use a negative fpdu_part_rcvd
value as a copy offset, which creates an OOB write.
Use the number of header bytes already received when calculating the
next copy length. |
| Oracle VM VirtualBox before 7.2.8 allows guest OS users to cause an out-of-bounds write in the host OS in pcnetReceiveNoSync in DevPCNet.cpp in the PCNet (Am79C970A) network device model. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: iptfs: fix runt reassembly panic from short inner tot_len
When the start of an inner packet is split across two outer packets
such that fewer than 4 bytes land at the end of the first one,
__input_process_payload() saves those bytes as a runt and skips the
iplen/iphlen validation performed for in-place packets. When the
continuation packet arrives, iptfs_reassem_cont() only requires the
declared inner length to be >= sizeof(ra_runt) (6) before allocating
the reassembly skb with that attacker-controlled length.
However, __iptfs_iphlen() always returns the fixed minimum IP header
size (20 for IPv4, 40 for IPv6), so for an inner IPv4 tot_len in
[6, 19] the header-completion copy writes past the declared packet
length, and the subsequent "ipremain -= copylen" underflows to ~4GB,
leaving the payload copy length bounded only by blkoff (up to 64KB).
At runtime the skb_put() tailroom check turns this into
skb_over_panic(), i.e. an unprivileged kernel panic (DoS), reachable
locally via userns+netns IPTFS SAs and remotely against IPTFS VPN
gateways when the decrypted outer skb is linear (e.g. AF_PACKET taps,
tun/tap delivery).
Align the runt path with the normal path by requiring the declared
inner length to cover at least the IP header size. This also subsumes
the previous >= sizeof(ra_runt) check, since the minimum IP header
is always larger than the runt buffer.
This issue was found by the autokbug dynamic kernel fuzzer at
Tencent Yunding Lab. |
| ImageSharp is a 2D graphics library. From 4.0.0 until 4.1.2, ICC LUT16 conversion accepts more than four output channels even though ClutCalculator.Calculate and LutEntryCalculator.CalculateLut store intermediate and output values in Vector4. When DecoderOptions.ColorProfileHandling is set to Convert, a malformed embedded profile can direct interpolation and output-LUT operations to write one float per declared channel beyond the four-float destination. This can corrupt memory and terminate the process; the default Preserve mode does not run ICC conversion. This issue is fixed in version 4.1.2. |
| ImageSharp is a 2D graphics library. From 3.0.0 until 4.1.1, decoding a strip TIFF using CCITT Group 3 or Modified Huffman compression can pass attacker-expanded runs to BitWriterUtils.WriteBits without first checking the current row width. T4TiffCompression.WritePixelRun can accumulate oversized makeup-code runs, and ModifiedHuffmanTiffCompression.Decompress validates the width only after writing. The unchecked writes can overflow the strip buffer, corrupt heap memory, and terminate the process. This strip-path vulnerability is distinct from the tiled decompressor-width mismatch. This issue is fixed in version 4.1.1. |
| ImageSharp is a 2D graphics library. From 3.0.0 until 4.1.1, tiled TIFF decoding allocates a destination buffer using TileWidth but TiffDecompressorsFactory.Create constructs T4, T6, and Modified Huffman decompressors using the full frame width. TiffDecoderCore.DecodeTilesChunky can therefore direct frame-width fax scanlines into a tile-width buffer when TileWidth is smaller than ImageWidth. The mismatch causes attacker-controlled out-of-bounds writes, heap corruption, and process termination even with legal per-row run codes. This tiled-path vulnerability is distinct from oversized CCITT runs in strip decoding. This issue is fixed in version 4.1.1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/gud: fix out-of-bounds write in gud_plane_atomic_check()
The plane property loop uses req->properties[num_properties + i] as write
index while simultaneously incrementing `num_properties` inside the loop.
At iteration i, num_properties has also incremented by i, so the write
is done at `initial_num_properties + 2*i`, skipping every other index and
advancing by 2 per iteration.
With just 2 connector and 32 plane properties the last write happens at
index 64, one slot past the end of the 64-slot (indices 0–63)
allocation. A USB device can trigger OOB by advertising the maximum
number of properties.
Fix by dropping the redundant `+ i`; num_properties is already the correct
running index, as gud_connector_fill_properties() fills the preceding
slots. |
| In AMD Versal™ Adaptive SoC devices, insufficient boundary checks in USB boot mode—when enabled through board modifications—could allow crafted images to trigger a buffer overflow and overwrite an active function pointer, which may result in arbitrary code execution during boot process. This condition could lead to potential impacts on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. |
| A flaw was found in SSSD's NFS idmap plugin. When retrieving cached user or group names, the plugin detects if an entry exceeds the destination buffer size but fails to abort before copying data. A local attacker can trigger this vulnerability by requesting identity lookups that resolve to oversized cached entries, resulting in an out-of-bounds write. This flaw primarily leads to a Denial of Service (DoS) by crashing the identity mapping service, and may also corrupt adjacent process memory. |
| Insufficient boundary validation in the USB boot mode implementation of AMD Zynq™ UltraScale+ MPSoC and RFSoC devices could allow unbounded Device Firmware Upgrade (DFU) download requests to overflow the DDR receive buffer into FSBL memory, potentially resulting in unauthorized code execution during the boot process. This issue could impact the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of affected system. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: 6fire: fix OOB write from device-reported iso length
usb6fire_pcm_in_urb_handler() sizes each outgoing isochronous packet as
(actual_length - 4) / (in_n_analog << 2) * (out_n_analog << 2) + 4, where
actual_length is the unsigned length the device reported for the matching
IN packet. A packet completed with status 0 and actual_length < 4 wraps
the subtraction to 0x7fffffec; a zero-length isochronous packet is legal
on the bus, and the preceding loop rejects only non-zero status. The sum
reaches memset() on out_urb->buffer, a 4832-byte object from
kcalloc(PCM_MAX_PACKET_SIZE, PCM_N_PACKETS_PER_URB).
Even without the wrap the result is out of bounds: at 88.2/96 kHz the
4-in/6-out scaling turns a full 420-byte IN packet into 628, so eight
packets span 5024 bytes of that buffer. usb_submit_urb() rejects an
over-long descriptor only after the memset() and the
usb6fire_pcm_playback() copy of user PCM data have run.
Guard the subtraction as the sibling usb6fire_pcm_capture() already does,
and limit the frame count to what fits in rt->out_packet_size, the OUT
endpoint's wMaxPacketSize. This bounds total_length by the buffer size
while keeping each packet length aligned to a whole output frame.
BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in usb6fire_pcm_in_urb_handler (sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c:338)
Write of size 18446744073709551456 at addr ffff88802a3d0000 by task vhci_rx/5018
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
kasan_check_range (mm/kasan/generic.c:186 mm/kasan/generic.c:200)
__asan_memset (mm/kasan/shadow.c:84)
usb6fire_pcm_in_urb_handler (sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c:338)
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1657)
usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1741)
vhci_rx_loop (drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_rx.c:107 drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_rx.c:242)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
Allocated by task 10:
__kmalloc_cache_noprof (mm/slub.c:5563)
usb6fire_pcm_init (sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c:560 sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c:595)
usb6fire_chip_probe (sound/usb/6fire/chip.c:133)
usb_probe_interface (drivers/usb/core/driver.c:399)
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802a3d0000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
4832-byte region [ffff88802a3d0000, ffff88802a3d12e0)
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt |
| Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to 9.2.0846, set_sofo() in src/spellfile.c reuses sl_sal_first[] without resetting values left by set_sal_first(), so a crafted spell file containing an SN_SAL section before an SN_SOFO section causes under-counted mapping lists and attacker-influenced writes beyond a heap allocation. This issue is fixed in version 9.2.0846. |