| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/sysfs: cleanup attrs subdirs on context dir setup failure
When a context DAMON sysfs directory setup is failed after setup of attrs/
directory, subdirectories of attrs/ directory are not cleaned up. As a
result, DAMON sysfs interface is nearly broken until the system reboots,
and the memory for the unremoved directory is leaked.
Cleanup the directories under such failures. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: reset sparse-read state in osd_fault()
When a fault occurs, the connection is abandoned, reestablished, and any
pending operations are retried. The OSD client tracks the progress of a
sparse-read reply using a separate state machine, largely independent of
the messenger's state.
If a connection is lost mid-payload or the sparse-read state machine
returns an error, the sparse-read state is not reset. The OSD client
will then interpret the beginning of a new reply as the continuation of
the old one. If this makes the sparse-read machinery enter a failure
state, it may never recover, producing loops like:
libceph: [0] got 0 extents
libceph: data len 142248331 != extent len 0
libceph: osd0 (1)...:6801 socket error on read
libceph: data len 142248331 != extent len 0
libceph: osd0 (1)...:6801 socket error on read
Therefore, reset the sparse-read state in osd_fault(), ensuring retries
start from a clean state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath10k: fix dma_free_coherent() pointer
dma_alloc_coherent() allocates a DMA mapped buffer and stores the
addresses in XXX_unaligned fields. Those should be reused when freeing
the buffer rather than the aligned addresses. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: Set __nocfi on swsusp_arch_resume()
A DABT is reported[1] on an android based system when resume from hiberate.
This happens because swsusp_arch_suspend_exit() is marked with SYM_CODE_*()
and does not have a CFI hash, but swsusp_arch_resume() will attempt to
verify the CFI hash when calling a copy of swsusp_arch_suspend_exit().
Given that there's an existing requirement that the entrypoint to
swsusp_arch_suspend_exit() is the first byte of the .hibernate_exit.text
section, we cannot fix this by marking swsusp_arch_suspend_exit() with
SYM_FUNC_*(). The simplest fix for now is to disable the CFI check in
swsusp_arch_resume().
Mark swsusp_arch_resume() as __nocfi to disable the CFI check.
[1]
[ 22.991934][ T1] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000000109170ffc
[ 22.991934][ T1] Mem abort info:
[ 22.991934][ T1] ESR = 0x0000000096000007
[ 22.991934][ T1] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 22.991934][ T1] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 22.991934][ T1] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 22.991934][ T1] FSC = 0x07: level 3 translation fault
[ 22.991934][ T1] Data abort info:
[ 22.991934][ T1] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[ 22.991934][ T1] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[ 22.991934][ T1] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[ 22.991934][ T1] [0000000109170ffc] user address but active_mm is swapper
[ 22.991934][ T1] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000007 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 22.991934][ T1] Dumping ftrace buffer:
[ 22.991934][ T1] (ftrace buffer empty)
[ 22.991934][ T1] Modules linked in:
[ 22.991934][ T1] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.6.98-android15-8-g0b1d2aee7fc3-dirty-4k #1 688c7060a825a3ac418fe53881730b355915a419
[ 22.991934][ T1] Hardware name: Unisoc UMS9360-base Board (DT)
[ 22.991934][ T1] pstate: 804000c5 (Nzcv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 22.991934][ T1] pc : swsusp_arch_resume+0x2ac/0x344
[ 22.991934][ T1] lr : swsusp_arch_resume+0x294/0x344
[ 22.991934][ T1] sp : ffffffc08006b960
[ 22.991934][ T1] x29: ffffffc08006b9c0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
[ 22.991934][ T1] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000820
[ 22.991934][ T1] x23: ffffffd0817e3000 x22: ffffffd0817e3000 x21: 0000000000000000
[ 22.991934][ T1] x20: ffffff8089171000 x19: ffffffd08252c8c8 x18: ffffffc080061058
[ 22.991934][ T1] x17: 00000000529c6ef0 x16: 00000000529c6ef0 x15: 0000000000000004
[ 22.991934][ T1] x14: ffffff8178c88000 x13: 0000000000000006 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 22.991934][ T1] x11: 0000000000000015 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : ffffffd082533000
[ 22.991934][ T1] x8 : 0000000109171000 x7 : 205b5d3433393139 x6 : 392e32322020205b
[ 22.991934][ T1] x5 : 000000010916f000 x4 : 000000008164b000 x3 : ffffff808a4e0530
[ 22.991934][ T1] x2 : ffffffd08058e784 x1 : 0000000082326000 x0 : 000000010a283000
[ 22.991934][ T1] Call trace:
[ 22.991934][ T1] swsusp_arch_resume+0x2ac/0x344
[ 22.991934][ T1] hibernation_restore+0x158/0x18c
[ 22.991934][ T1] load_image_and_restore+0xb0/0xec
[ 22.991934][ T1] software_resume+0xf4/0x19c
[ 22.991934][ T1] software_resume_initcall+0x34/0x78
[ 22.991934][ T1] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x370
[ 22.991934][ T1] do_initcall_level+0xc8/0x19c
[ 22.991934][ T1] do_initcalls+0x70/0xc0
[ 22.991934][ T1] do_basic_setup+0x1c/0x28
[ 22.991934][ T1] kernel_init_freeable+0xe0/0x148
[ 22.991934][ T1] kernel_init+0x20/0x1a8
[ 22.991934][ T1] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 22.991934][ T1] Code: a9400a61 f94013e0 f9438923 f9400a64 (b85fc110)
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: commit log updated by Mark Rutland] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mISDN: annotate data-race around dev->work
dev->work can re read locklessly in mISDN_read()
and mISDN_poll(). Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations.
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in mISDN_ioctl / mISDN_read
write to 0xffff88812d848280 of 4 bytes by task 10864 on cpu 1:
misdn_add_timer drivers/isdn/mISDN/timerdev.c:175 [inline]
mISDN_ioctl+0x2fb/0x550 drivers/isdn/mISDN/timerdev.c:233
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xce/0x140 fs/ioctl.c:583
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x43/0x50 fs/ioctl.c:583
x64_sys_call+0x14b0/0x3000 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:17
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x2c0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
read to 0xffff88812d848280 of 4 bytes by task 10857 on cpu 0:
mISDN_read+0x1f2/0x470 drivers/isdn/mISDN/timerdev.c:112
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:847 [inline]
vfs_readv+0x3fb/0x690 fs/read_write.c:1020
do_readv+0xe7/0x210 fs/read_write.c:1080
__do_sys_readv fs/read_write.c:1165 [inline]
__se_sys_readv fs/read_write.c:1162 [inline]
__x64_sys_readv+0x45/0x50 fs/read_write.c:1162
x64_sys_call+0x2831/0x3000 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:20
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x2c0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000001 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-tcp: add bounds checks in nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec
nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec() could walk past cmd->req.sg when a PDU
length or offset exceeds sg_cnt and then use bogus sg->length/offset
values, leading to _copy_to_iter() GPF/KASAN. Guard sg_idx, remaining
entries, and sg->length/offset before building the bvec. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: qfq: Use cl_is_active to determine whether class is active in qfq_rm_from_ag
This is more of a preventive patch to make the code more consistent and
to prevent possible exploits that employ child qlen manipulations on qfq.
use cl_is_active instead of relying on the child qdisc's qlen to determine
class activation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvlan: Make the addrs_lock be per port
Make the addrs_lock be per port, not per ipvlan dev.
Initial code seems to be written in the assumption,
that any address change must occur under RTNL.
But it is not so for the case of IPv6. So
1) Introduce per-port addrs_lock.
2) It was needed to fix places where it was forgotten
to take lock (ipvlan_open/ipvlan_close)
This appears to be a very minor problem though.
Since it's highly unlikely that ipvlan_add_addr() will
be called on 2 CPU simultaneously. But nevertheless,
this could cause:
1) False-negative of ipvlan_addr_busy(): one interface
iterated through all port->ipvlans + ipvlan->addrs
under some ipvlan spinlock, and another added IP
under its own lock. Though this is only possible
for IPv6, since looks like only ipvlan_addr6_event() can be
called without rtnl_lock.
2) Race since ipvlan_ht_addr_add(port) is called under
different ipvlan->addrs_lock locks
This should not affect performance, since add/remove IP
is a rare situation and spinlock is not taken on fast
paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
leds: led-class: Only Add LED to leds_list when it is fully ready
Before this change the LED was added to leds_list before led_init_core()
gets called adding it the list before led_classdev.set_brightness_work gets
initialized.
This leaves a window where led_trigger_register() of a LED's default
trigger will call led_trigger_set() which calls led_set_brightness()
which in turn will end up queueing the *uninitialized*
led_classdev.set_brightness_work.
This race gets hit by the lenovo-thinkpad-t14s EC driver which registers
2 LEDs with a default trigger provided by snd_ctl_led.ko in quick
succession. The first led_classdev_register() causes an async modprobe of
snd_ctl_led to run and that async modprobe manages to exactly hit
the window where the second LED is on the leds_list without led_init_core()
being called for it, resulting in:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 11 PID: 5608 at kernel/workqueue.c:4234 __flush_work+0x344/0x390
Hardware name: LENOVO 21N2S01F0B/21N2S01F0B, BIOS N42ET93W (2.23 ) 09/01/2025
...
Call trace:
__flush_work+0x344/0x390 (P)
flush_work+0x2c/0x50
led_trigger_set+0x1c8/0x340
led_trigger_register+0x17c/0x1c0
led_trigger_register_simple+0x84/0xe8
snd_ctl_led_init+0x40/0xf88 [snd_ctl_led]
do_one_initcall+0x5c/0x318
do_init_module+0x9c/0x2b8
load_module+0x7e0/0x998
Close the race window by moving the adding of the LED to leds_list to
after the led_init_core() call. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
migrate: correct lock ordering for hugetlb file folios
Syzbot has found a deadlock (analyzed by Lance Yang):
1) Task (5749): Holds folio_lock, then tries to acquire i_mmap_rwsem(read lock).
2) Task (5754): Holds i_mmap_rwsem(write lock), then tries to acquire
folio_lock.
migrate_pages()
-> migrate_hugetlbs()
-> unmap_and_move_huge_page() <- Takes folio_lock!
-> remove_migration_ptes()
-> __rmap_walk_file()
-> i_mmap_lock_read() <- Waits for i_mmap_rwsem(read lock)!
hugetlbfs_fallocate()
-> hugetlbfs_punch_hole() <- Takes i_mmap_rwsem(write lock)!
-> hugetlbfs_zero_partial_page()
-> filemap_lock_hugetlb_folio()
-> filemap_lock_folio()
-> __filemap_get_folio <- Waits for folio_lock!
The migration path is the one taking locks in the wrong order according to
the documentation at the top of mm/rmap.c. So expand the scope of the
existing i_mmap_lock to cover the calls to remove_migration_ptes() too.
This is (mostly) how it used to be after commit c0d0381ade79. That was
removed by 336bf30eb765 for both file & anon hugetlb pages when it should
only have been removed for anon hugetlb pages. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
irqchip/gic-v3-its: Avoid truncating memory addresses
On 32-bit machines with CONFIG_ARM_LPAE, it is possible for lowmem
allocations to be backed by addresses physical memory above the 32-bit
address limit, as found while experimenting with larger VMSPLIT
configurations.
This caused the qemu virt model to crash in the GICv3 driver, which
allocates the 'itt' object using GFP_KERNEL. Since all memory below
the 4GB physical address limit is in ZONE_DMA in this configuration,
kmalloc() defaults to higher addresses for ZONE_NORMAL, and the
ITS driver stores the physical address in a 32-bit 'unsigned long'
variable.
Change the itt_addr variable to the correct phys_addr_t type instead,
along with all other variables in this driver that hold a physical
address.
The gicv5 driver correctly uses u64 variables, while all other irqchip
drivers don't call virt_to_phys or similar interfaces. It's expected that
other device drivers have similar issues, but fixing this one is
sufficient for booting a virtio based guest. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fou: Don't allow 0 for FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO.
fou_udp_recv() has the same problem mentioned in the previous
patch.
If FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO is set to 0, skb is not freed by
fou_udp_recv() nor "resubmit"-ted in ip_protocol_deliver_rcu().
Let's forbid 0 for FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/virtio: fix potential underflow in virtio_transport_get_credit()
The credit calculation in virtio_transport_get_credit() uses unsigned
arithmetic:
ret = vvs->peer_buf_alloc - (vvs->tx_cnt - vvs->peer_fwd_cnt);
If the peer shrinks its advertised buffer (peer_buf_alloc) while bytes
are in flight, the subtraction can underflow and produce a large
positive value, potentially allowing more data to be queued than the
peer can handle.
Reuse virtio_transport_has_space() which already handles this case and
add a comment to make it clear why we are doing that.
[Stefano: use virtio_transport_has_space() instead of duplicating the code]
[Stefano: tweak the commit message] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix recvmsg() unconditional requeue
If rxrpc_recvmsg() fails because MSG_DONTWAIT was specified but the call at
the front of the recvmsg queue already has its mutex locked, it requeues
the call - whether or not the call is already queued. The call may be on
the queue because MSG_PEEK was also passed and so the call was not dequeued
or because the I/O thread requeued it.
The unconditional requeue may then corrupt the recvmsg queue, leading to
things like UAFs or refcount underruns.
Fix this by only requeuing the call if it isn't already on the queue - and
moving it to the front if it is already queued. If we don't queue it, we
have to put the ref we obtained by dequeuing it.
Also, MSG_PEEK doesn't dequeue the call so shouldn't call
rxrpc_notify_socket() for the call if we didn't use up all the data on the
queue, so fix that also. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: ip_gre: make ipgre_header() robust
Analog to commit db5b4e39c4e6 ("ip6_gre: make ip6gre_header() robust")
Over the years, syzbot found many ways to crash the kernel
in ipgre_header() [1].
This involves team or bonding drivers ability to dynamically
change their dev->needed_headroom and/or dev->hard_header_len
In this particular crash mld_newpack() allocated an skb
with a too small reserve/headroom, and by the time mld_sendpack()
was called, syzbot managed to attach an ipgre device.
[1]
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff89ea3cb7 len:2030915468 put:2030915372 head:ffff888058b43000 data:ffff887fdfa6e194 tail:0x120 end:0x6c0 dev:team0
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:213 !
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1322 Comm: kworker/1:9 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025
Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work
RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x157/0x160 net/core/skbuff.c:213
Call Trace:
<TASK>
skb_under_panic net/core/skbuff.c:223 [inline]
skb_push+0xc3/0xe0 net/core/skbuff.c:2641
ipgre_header+0x67/0x290 net/ipv4/ip_gre.c:897
dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3436 [inline]
neigh_connected_output+0x286/0x460 net/core/neighbour.c:1618
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline]
ip6_output+0x340/0x550 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:247
NF_HOOK+0x9e/0x380 include/linux/netfilter.h:318
mld_sendpack+0x8d4/0xe60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1855
mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2154 [inline]
mld_ifc_work+0x83e/0xd60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2693
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xad1/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3340
worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3421
kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463
ret_from_fork+0x510/0xa50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/fpu: Clear XSTATE_BV[i] in guest XSAVE state whenever XFD[i]=1
When loading guest XSAVE state via KVM_SET_XSAVE, and when updating XFD in
response to a guest WRMSR, clear XFD-disabled features in the saved (or to
be restored) XSTATE_BV to ensure KVM doesn't attempt to load state for
features that are disabled via the guest's XFD. Because the kernel
executes XRSTOR with the guest's XFD, saving XSTATE_BV[i]=1 with XFD[i]=1
will cause XRSTOR to #NM and panic the kernel.
E.g. if fpu_update_guest_xfd() sets XFD without clearing XSTATE_BV:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#29: amx_test/848
Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
CPU: 29 UID: 1000 PID: 848 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-ffa07f7fd437-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm #171 NONE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110
Call Trace:
<TASK>
asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20
RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90
switch_fpu_return+0x4a/0xb0
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1245/0x1e40 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
This can happen if the guest executes WRMSR(MSR_IA32_XFD) to set XFD[18] = 1,
and a host IRQ triggers kernel_fpu_begin() prior to the vmexit handler's
call to fpu_update_guest_xfd().
and if userspace stuffs XSTATE_BV[i]=1 via KVM_SET_XSAVE:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#14: amx_test/867
Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
CPU: 14 UID: 1000 PID: 867 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-2dace9faccd6-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm #168 NONE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110
Call Trace:
<TASK>
asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20
RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90
fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate+0x6b/0x120
kvm_load_guest_fpu+0x30/0x80 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x85/0x1e40 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
The new behavior is consistent with the AMX architecture. Per Intel's SDM,
XSAVE saves XSTATE_BV as '0' for components that are disabled via XFD
(and non-compacted XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the state
component):
If XSAVE, XSAVEC, XSAVEOPT, or XSAVES is saving the state component i,
the instruction does not generate #NM when XCR0[i] = IA32_XFD[i] = 1;
instead, it operates as if XINUSE[i] = 0 (and the state component was
in its initial state): it saves bit i of XSTATE_BV field of the XSAVE
header as 0; in addition, XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the
state component (the other instructions do not save state component i).
Alternatively, KVM could always do XRSTOR with XFD=0, e.g. by using
a constant XFD based on the set of enabled features when XSAVEing for
a struct fpu_guest. However, having XSTATE_BV[i]=1 for XFD-disabled
features can only happen in the above interrupt case, or in similar
scenarios involving preemption on preemptible kernels, because
fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate()'s call to save_fpregs_to_fpstate() saves the
outgoing FPU state with the current XFD; and that is (on all but the
first WRMSR to XFD) the guest XFD.
Therefore, XFD can only go out of sync with XSTATE_BV in the above
interrupt case, or in similar scenarios involving preemption on
preemptible kernels, and it we can consider it (de facto) part of KVM
ABI that KVM_GET_XSAVE returns XSTATE_BV[i]=0 for XFD-disabled features.
[Move clea
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dst: fix races in rt6_uncached_list_del() and rt_del_uncached_list()
syzbot was able to crash the kernel in rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev()
in an interesting way [1]
Crash happens in list_del_init()/INIT_LIST_HEAD() while writing
list->prev, while the prior write on list->next went well.
static inline void INIT_LIST_HEAD(struct list_head *list)
{
WRITE_ONCE(list->next, list); // This went well
WRITE_ONCE(list->prev, list); // Crash, @list has been freed.
}
Issue here is that rt6_uncached_list_del() did not attempt to lock
ul->lock, as list_empty(&rt->dst.rt_uncached) returned
true because the WRITE_ONCE(list->next, list) happened on the other CPU.
We might use list_del_init_careful() and list_empty_careful(),
or make sure rt6_uncached_list_del() always grabs the spinlock
whenever rt->dst.rt_uncached_list has been set.
A similar fix is neeed for IPv4.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in INIT_LIST_HEAD include/linux/list.h:46 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in list_del_init include/linux/list.h:296 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev net/ipv6/route.c:191 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rt6_disable_ip+0x633/0x730 net/ipv6/route.c:5020
Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880294cfa78 by task kworker/u8:14/3450
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3450 Comm: kworker/u8:14 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT_{RT,(full)}
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
INIT_LIST_HEAD include/linux/list.h:46 [inline]
list_del_init include/linux/list.h:296 [inline]
rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev net/ipv6/route.c:191 [inline]
rt6_disable_ip+0x633/0x730 net/ipv6/route.c:5020
addrconf_ifdown+0x143/0x18a0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3853
addrconf_notify+0x1bc/0x1050 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:-1
notifier_call_chain+0x19d/0x3a0 kernel/notifier.c:85
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2268 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2282 [inline]
netif_close_many+0x29c/0x410 net/core/dev.c:1785
unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0xb50/0x2330 net/core/dev.c:12353
ops_exit_rtnl_list net/core/net_namespace.c:187 [inline]
ops_undo_list+0x3dc/0x990 net/core/net_namespace.c:248
cleanup_net+0x4de/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:696
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xad1/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3340
worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3421
kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463
ret_from_fork+0x510/0xa50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246
</TASK>
Allocated by task 803:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:78
unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:340 [inline]
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x6c/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:366
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:253 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4953 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5263 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x18d/0x6c0 mm/slub.c:5270
dst_alloc+0x105/0x170 net/core/dst.c:89
ip6_dst_alloc net/ipv6/route.c:342 [inline]
icmp6_dst_alloc+0x75/0x460 net/ipv6/route.c:3333
mld_sendpack+0x683/0xe60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1844
mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2154 [inline]
mld_ifc_work+0x83e/0xd60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2693
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xad1/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3340
worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3421
kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463
ret_from_fork+0x510/0xa50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entr
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ip6_tunnel: use skb_vlan_inet_prepare() in __ip6_tnl_rcv()
Blamed commit did not take care of VLAN encapsulations
as spotted by syzbot [1].
Use skb_vlan_inet_prepare() instead of pskb_inet_may_pull().
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:253 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:275 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in IP6_ECN_decapsulate+0x7a8/0x1fa0 include/net/inet_ecn.h:321
__INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:253 [inline]
INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:275 [inline]
IP6_ECN_decapsulate+0x7a8/0x1fa0 include/net/inet_ecn.h:321
ip6ip6_dscp_ecn_decapsulate+0x16f/0x1b0 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:729
__ip6_tnl_rcv+0xed9/0x1b50 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:860
ip6_tnl_rcv+0xc3/0x100 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:903
gre_rcv+0x1529/0x1b90 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:-1
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x1c89/0x2c60 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438
ip6_input_finish+0x1f4/0x4a0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:489
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline]
ip6_input+0x9c/0x330 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:500
ip6_mc_input+0x7ca/0xc10 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:590
dst_input include/net/dst.h:474 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish+0x958/0x990 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline]
ipv6_rcv+0xf1/0x3c0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:311
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:6139 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb+0x1df/0xac0 net/core/dev.c:6252
netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:6338 [inline]
netif_receive_skb+0x57/0x630 net/core/dev.c:6397
tun_rx_batched+0x1df/0x980 drivers/net/tun.c:1485
tun_get_user+0x5c0e/0x6c60 drivers/net/tun.c:1953
tun_chr_write_iter+0x3e9/0x5c0 drivers/net/tun.c:1999
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline]
vfs_write+0xbe2/0x15d0 fs/read_write.c:686
ksys_write fs/read_write.c:738 [inline]
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:749 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:746 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0x1fb/0x4d0 fs/read_write.c:746
x64_sys_call+0x30ab/0x3e70 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:2
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd3/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4960 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5263 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x9e7/0x17a0 mm/slub.c:5315
kmalloc_reserve+0x13c/0x4b0 net/core/skbuff.c:586
__alloc_skb+0x805/0x1040 net/core/skbuff.c:690
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1383 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc5/0xa60 net/core/skbuff.c:6712
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xacc/0xc60 net/core/sock.c:2995
tun_alloc_skb drivers/net/tun.c:1461 [inline]
tun_get_user+0x1142/0x6c60 drivers/net/tun.c:1794
tun_chr_write_iter+0x3e9/0x5c0 drivers/net/tun.c:1999
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline]
vfs_write+0xbe2/0x15d0 fs/read_write.c:686
ksys_write fs/read_write.c:738 [inline]
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:749 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:746 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0x1fb/0x4d0 fs/read_write.c:746
x64_sys_call+0x30ab/0x3e70 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:2
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd3/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6465 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(none)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: can: j1939: j1939_xtp_rx_rts_session_active(): deactivate session upon receiving the second rts
Since j1939_session_deactivate_activate_next() in j1939_tp_rxtimer() is
called only when the timer is enabled, we need to call
j1939_session_deactivate_activate_next() if we cancelled the timer.
Otherwise, refcount for j1939_session leaks, which will later appear as
| unregister_netdevice: waiting for vcan0 to become free. Usage count = 2.
problem. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: return the handler error from mon_handle_auth_done()
Currently any error from ceph_auth_handle_reply_done() is propagated
via finish_auth() but isn't returned from mon_handle_auth_done(). This
results in higher layers learning that (despite the monitor considering
us to be successfully authenticated) something went wrong in the
authentication phase and reacting accordingly, but msgr2 still trying
to proceed with establishing the session in the background. In the
case of secure mode this can trigger a WARN in setup_crypto() and later
lead to a NULL pointer dereference inside of prepare_auth_signature(). |
