| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Improper input validation in MPEG4 codec in libsavsvc.so prior to SMR Aug-2026 Release 1 allows local attackers to write out-of-bounds memory. |
| An issue was identified in which CSRF tokens were generated using a predictable method, potentially reducing their effectiveness as a security control. This has been addressed by improving the randomness and entropy of token generation. |
| An improper access control vulnerability exists where an authenticated non-administrative application user could potentially view settings outside of their assigned scope. |
| In display, there is a possible information disclosure due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to local information disclosure if a malicious actor has already obtained the System privilege. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS11004276; Issue ID: MSV-7757. |
| In display, there is a possible information disclosure due to an integer overflow. This could lead to local information disclosure if a malicious actor has already obtained the System privilege. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS11004274; Issue ID: MSV-7749. |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote attacker to cause a denial of service due to an out-of-bounds read. |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information or cause a denial of service due to an out-of-bounds read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (nct6775-core) Prevent access to unsupported weight registers
Sashiko reports:
During initialization of the nct6116 chip, the driver sets data->pwm_num
to 5. However, it assigns several NCT6106 register arrays (such as
NCT6106_REG_WEIGHT_DUTY_STEP, NCT6106_REG_WEIGHT_TEMP_SEL, and
NCT6106_REG_WEIGHT_TEMP_*) to data->REG_PWM and data->REG_WEIGHT_TEMP.
These arrays only contain 3 elements.
In nct6775_update_pwm(), the driver iterates up to data->pwm_num. If
data->has_pwm has bits 3 or 4 set (which is structurally possible for
nct6116), the loop attempts to read elements at index 3 and 4 from these
3-element arrays. This results in a global out-of-bounds read, which can
be caught by KASAN.
Furthermore, the driver uses these garbage out-of-bounds values as
hardware register addresses for subsequent read and write operations. This
leads to invalid hardware register access, potentially causing hardware
misconfiguration or system crashes.
The underlying problem is that the chip does support up to five fan
control channels, but only the first three support weight control.
Fix the problem by extending the affected weight register arrays with
zeroed fields. The driver uses zeroed register addresses to determine
if a register is supported or not, and skips accesses for unsupported
registers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/x86/amd/brs: Fix kernel address leakage
A user-only branch stack can contain branches that originate from
the kernel. As a result, kernel addresses are exposed to user space
even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. On AMD processors
supporting X86_FEATURE_BRS (Zen 3 only), perf can still report entries
such as SYSRET/interrupt returns for which the branch-from addresses
are in the kernel.
E.g.
$ perf record -j any,u -c 4000 -e branch-brs -o - -- \
perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \
perf script -i - -F brstack|tr ' ' '\n'| \
grep -E '0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}'
...
0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2e32955eb/-/-/-/0//-
0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2d94a9821/-/-/-/0//-
0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2d94ffa1b/-/-/-/0//-
...
BRS provides no hardware branch filtering, so privilege level
filtering is performed entirely in software. However, amd_brs_match_plm()
only validates the branch-to address against the requested privilege
levels. For branches from the kernel to user space, the branch-from
address is left unchecked and is leaked. Extend the software filter to
also validate the branch-from address, so that any branch record whose
branch-from address is in the kernel is dropped when
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mips: sched: Fix CPUMASK_OFFSTACK memory corruption
This patch addresses a critical memory management flaw. When
CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK is enabled, cpumask_var_t is a pointer.
Consequently, sizeof(new_mask) evaluates to the pointer size, causing
copy_from_user() to clobber the mask pointer. Furthermore, the old
logic performed copy_from_user() before allocating the mask.
Fix this by allocating new_mask first. To handle variable-sized user
masks correctly, use cpumask_size() to truncate overly large user masks
or pad undersized masks with zeros before copying the data directly into
the allocated buffer. |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote attacker to cause a denial of service due to an off-by-one error in bounds checking. |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information due to an out-of-bounds read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_ncm: validate datagram bounds in ncm_unwrap_ntb()
When unpacking host-supplied NTBs, ncm_unwrap_ntb() checks datagram length
against frame_max but does not verify that the datagram fits within the
declared block length. Additionally, when decoding multiple NTBs from a
single socket buffer, subsequent block lengths are not checked against the
actual remaining buffer data.
With these checks missing, a malicious USB host can specify datagram
offsets and lengths that point beyond the block, or supply secondary NTB
headers declaring lengths larger than the buffer. skb_put_data() then
copies adjacent kernel memory from skb_shared_info into the network skb.
Fix this by verifying that sufficient buffer space remains for the NTB
header before parsing, handling zero-length block declarations, ensuring
that block lengths never exceed the remaining buffer space, and verifying
that each datagram payload stays strictly within the block boundary. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: uvc: clamp SEND_RESPONSE length to the response buffer
uvc_send_response() builds the UVC control response from a user-supplied
struct uvc_request_data:
req->length = min_t(unsigned int, uvc->event_length, data->length);
...
memcpy(req->buf, data->data, req->length);
req->length is clamped to uvc->event_length, which is taken from the
host control request wLength (up to UVC_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE, 64), and to
data->length, which comes from the UVCIOC_SEND_RESPONSE ioctl and is
only checked for being negative. The source buffer data->data is only
60 bytes, so a response with uvc->event_length and data->length both
greater than 60 makes memcpy() read past the end of data->data.
Clamp req->length to sizeof(data->data) as well. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: fix potential buffer underflow in ath11k_hal_rx_msdu_list_get()
When the first entry in msdu_details has a zero buffer address,
the code accesses msdu_details[i - 1] with i == 0, causing a
buffer underflow.
Fix similarly to ath12k_wifi7_hal_rx_msdu_list_get() by adding
a separate check for i == 0 before the main condition to prevent
the out-of-bounds access.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: carl9170: bound memcpy length in cmd callback to prevent OOB read
When the firmware sends a command response with a length mismatch,
carl9170_cmd_callback() logs the mismatch and calls carl9170_restart()
but then falls through to memcpy(ar->readbuf, buffer + 4, len - 4).
Since len comes from the firmware and can exceed ar->readlen, this
copies more data than the readbuf was allocated for.
Bound the memcpy to min(len - 4, ar->readlen) so that the response
is still completed -- avoiding repeated restarts from queued garbage --
while preventing an overread past the response buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: carl9170: fix OOB read from off-by-two in TX status handler
The bounds check in carl9170_tx_process_status() uses
`i > ((cmd->hdr.len / 2) + 1)` which is off by two, allowing
2 extra iterations past valid _tx_status entries when the firmware-
controlled hdr.ext exceeds hdr.len/2. Fix by using the correct
comparison `i >= (cmd->hdr.len / 2)`. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: carl9170: fix buffer overflow in rx_stream failover path
The failover continuation in carl9170_rx_stream() copies the full tlen
from the second USB transfer instead of capping at rx_failover_missing
bytes. When both transfers are near maximum size, the total exceeds the
65535-byte failover SKB, triggering skb_over_panic.
Limit the copy size to the missing byte count.
[Fix checkpatch CHECK:PARENTHESIS_ALIGNMENT] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: occ: validate poll response sensor blocks
The OCC poll response parser walks a counted list of sensor data blocks.
It used the static backing-array capacity as the parse boundary, but a
transport response makes only data_length bytes current and valid. A
truncated response can therefore make the parser consume a block header or
block extent outside the current response.
Use data_length as the parent boundary, prove the fixed poll header and
each current block header before reading them, and prove the complete block
before advancing. Keep parsed sensor metadata local until the complete
response has passed validation, then publish it. Propagate
malformed-response errors before publishing the OCC as active. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: cedrus: skip invalid H.264 reference list entries
Cedrus consumes H.264 ref_pic_list0/ref_pic_list1 entries from the
stateless slice control and later uses their indices to look up
decode->dpb[] in _cedrus_write_ref_list().
Rejecting such controls in cedrus_try_ctrl() would break existing
userspace, since stateless H.264 reference lists may legitimately carry
out-of-range indices for missing references. Instead, guard the actual
DPB lookup in Cedrus and skip entries whose indices do not fit the fixed
V4L2_H264_NUM_DPB_ENTRIES array.
This keeps the fix local to the driver use site and avoids out-of-bounds
reads from malformed or unsupported reference list entries. |
