| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: bound MDSCapAuth path and fs_name decode in handle_session()
handle_session() decodes the MDSCapAuth records carried by a
CEPH_SESSION_OPEN message (msg_version >= 6). For each record the
match.path and match.fs_name byte strings are read by first decoding a
32-bit length and then copying that many bytes with the bare
ceph_decode_copy(). Unlike the surrounding fields, which all use the
_safe decode variants, these two copies are not preceded by a
ceph_decode_need() bounds check, and the enclosing MDSCapAuth and
MDSCapMatch struct_len fields are skipped rather than enforced as an
upper bound. A length larger than the bytes remaining in the message
front makes ceph_decode_copy() read past the end of the front buffer.
The message front is a dedicated allocation (ceph_msg_new2() ->
kvmalloc), so the over-read runs off that object. A malicious or
compromised MDS can trigger this with the first post-connect message on
mount, with no client-side user interaction; under KASAN it is reported
as a slab-out-of-bounds read in handle_session().
Impact: a malicious MDS can force the kernel client to read up to 4 GiB
past the message front allocation during session setup, crashing the
client (out-of-bounds read).
Switch both copies to ceph_decode_copy_safe(), which performs the
ceph_decode_need() bounds check before the copy and branches to the
existing bad label, matching the rest of the decoder and the error path
that frees the partially decoded cap_auths array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: restore the data_offset bound in is_valid_oplock_break()
Commit 83bfbd0bb902 ("cifs: Remove the RFC1002 header from smb_hdr")
changed the quantity this bound is measured against. It used to be
srv->total_read minus the 4-byte RFC1002 preamble that total_read then
included, so it was the SMB message length. The same commit stopped
counting the preamble, and the mechanical substitution to
srv->total_read - srv->pdu_size left an expression that is identically
zero: standard_receive3() reads MID_HEADER_SIZE() bytes and then exactly
pdu_length - MID_HEADER_SIZE() more, adding both to total_read.
len is therefore 0, the subtraction below it wraps, and no __u32
DataOffset can exceed the result, so the check from commit 097f5863b1a0
("cifs: read overflow in is_valid_oplock_break()") no longer rejects
anything. Use total_read, which is now the message length on its own. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: intel-thc-hid: intel-quickspi: validate report size before copy
write_cmd_to_txdma() builds an output report in qsdev->report_buf, a heap
buffer allocated in quickspi_alloc_report_buf() to the device-descriptor
derived max_report_len (a few hundred bytes for a touch controller). It
copies the caller-supplied report into that buffer:
memcpy(write_buf->content, report_buf, report_buf_len);
The HID core caps a report at HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE (16384) by default, and
quickspi_hid_ll_driver does not set max_buffer_size, so the length reaches
the driver unbounded. A hidraw SET_REPORT/SET_FEATURE ioctl carrying a
report larger than max_report_len therefore overflows report_buf with
attacker-controlled length and content.
Record the report_buf allocation size and reject reports that do not fit
before copying, matching the equivalent guard in the intel-quicki2c
sibling (quicki2c_init_write_buf()) and the hid-goodix-spi fix.
write_cmd_to_txdma() writes the output report header ahead of the content
in the same buffer, so size the allocation to cover the header as well.
That keeps the added bound from rejecting a maximum-sized report. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: intel-thc-hid: intel-quickspi: bound GET_REPORT response to the caller buffer
quickspi_hid_raw_request() receives the caller's buffer length in len, but
quickspi_get_report() never sees it and copies the whole device-supplied
response into buf regardless:
memcpy(buf, qsdev->report_buf, qsdev->report_len);
qsdev->report_len comes from the input report the touch controller returns,
while buf is sized to whatever the caller asked hidraw for through
HIDIOCGFEATURE or HIDIOCGINPUT. A response larger than that overflows buf
with device-controlled content.
The intel-quicki2c sibling already passes the caller length down to
quicki2c_get_report() and validates the response against it before the
copy. Do the same here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: bound the free-cluster bitmap scan to the volume
vol->lcn_empty_bits_per_page is sized from vol->nr_clusters at mount, but
ntfs_cluster_alloc() bounds its scan of that array by the size of $Bitmap.
Those are independent on-disk quantities and the mount-time check only
rejects a $Bitmap that is too small, so an image whose $Bitmap covers more
clusters than the volume has lets the scan index past the array. A run
whose LCN lies in that gap takes the allocator straight there, since the
caller passes the file's own last LCN as its locality hint. KASAN reports
a slab out-of-bounds read when a file on such a volume is extended.
Clamp the scan to what that array covers, mirroring the max_index
calculation the mount-time scan already uses, and reject a decoded LCN
at or beyond nr_clusters in the mapping pairs decoder. Conforming
volumes are unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: APEI: GHES: fix ARM section length accounting after header
In ghes_handle_arm_hw_error(), after skipping the cper_sec_proc_arm
header with (err + 1), the remaining length was reduced by sizeof(err)
(pointer size) instead of sizeof(*err) (structure size).
That overestimates the bytes left for cper_arm_err_info records and can
let the parser read past the CPER section when err_info_num is large
enough relative to error_data_length.
Use sizeof(*err) so the length accounting matches the pointer advance
and the earlier sizeof(*err) size check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: validate user space vectors during extraction
The bio-based drivers don't necessarily check the alignment split, and
stacking block drivers don't always handle a misalignment detected after
submitting the bio. Validate user vectors against the device's
dma_alignment as the bio is built from the iov_iter, rejecting
misaligned early with -EINVAL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/features: bound fwctl command payload to the input buffer
fwctl_cmd_rpc() copies cmd->in_len bytes into inbuf = kvzalloc(cmd->in_len)
and passes inbuf and in_len to ->fw_rpc(). The CXL callback cxlctl_fw_rpc()
ignores in_len and never checks the user-controlled op_size against it.
cxlctl_set_feature() bounds op_size only from below
(op_size <= sizeof(feat_in->hdr)) and then reads op_size - sizeof(hdr)
bytes from feat_in->feat_data via cxl_set_feature(). With a small in_len
and a large op_size the first memcpy() already reads past the
kvzalloc(in_len) buffer; the out-of-bounds bytes are placed in the mailbox
payload and sent to the device, and a large enough op_size can walk into
unmapped memory and oops the kernel. The Get paths pin op_size to a fixed
size but likewise read the input struct without checking in_len.
Reject, at the single dispatch point, any request whose fixed header plus
op_size does not fit in the copied-in buffer. The lower-bound test guards
the subtraction and ensures op_size was copied in before it is read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: carry oversized SMC-Rv2 LLC messages in the queue entry
smc_llc_rmt_delete_rkey() and smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys() read the part
of a v2 message that does not fit into the 44-byte union smc_llc_msg, and
both bound themselves by the size of the buffer it landed in, not by what
arrived. On a link with a shared v2 receive buffer a 44-byte
DELETE_RKEY_V2 declaring 255 rkeys reaches rkey[9..254] in whatever an
earlier message left in lgr->wr_rx_buf_v2, and passes each of them to
smc_rtoken_delete(). One of those 255 matched a registered rtoken and
deleted it. An ADD_LINK on such a link installs up to 255 rtokens from
the same bytes.
Copy the tail into the queue entry, so its length is the length of the
message that arrived, and declare the rkeys that fit inline as a member of
the union instead of reaching them through a cast. The same
DELETE_RKEY_V2 now processes the 9 rkeys it carries. The copy is limited
to the longest tail the two functions can read, so the peer does not pick
the size of the entry.
The bound the previous patch placed on links without a shared v2 receive
buffer is no longer needed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-pcache: validate geometry fields from on-disk cache_info
cache_segs_init() iterates cache_info->n_segs times indexing
cache->segments[], which is sized to the cache device geometry, and
get_seg_id() takes each segment id from the on-media cache_info and the
per-segment next_seg link. Both come from cache device metadata that is
only CRC-protected with a fixed public seed, so whoever supplies the
cache device on a table load (CAP_SYS_ADMIN) controls them: an oversized
n_segs or an out-of-range id drives an out-of-bounds access of
cache->segments[] and a wild CACHE_DEV_SEGMENT() pointer into the device
mapping -- an out-of-bounds read and write from on-disk data.
Reject an n_segs that exceeds the device segment count and a segment id
that is out of range before either is used. Valid metadata is unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-pcache: validate kset key_num and intra-segment bounds
Two more fields decoded from the cache device go unbounded. The kset
key_num drives cache_kset_crc() and the replay loop in cache_replay(),
the writeback worker and the GC worker, but only the magic and a
fixed-seed CRC are checked first, so a non-last kset whose key_num exceeds
the PCACHE_KSET_KEYS_MAX buffer reads past its end before the CRC compare.
A key's intra-segment offset and length in cache_key_decode() are taken
verbatim, so a key running past its segment is replayed into the cache
tree and the data CRC check and every later read hit then copy adjacent
persistent memory into the caller's bio -- an out-of-bounds read that
leaks to user space. Both fields are controlled by whoever supplies the
cache device (CAP_SYS_ADMIN); the CRC seed is public.
Add kset_onmedia_valid() to bound key_num before any kset read, and
reject a key whose offset plus length, computed in 64 bits, exceeds the
segment data_size. Valid metadata is unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-pcache: bound the persisted tail-position offset
cache_pos_decode() takes the persisted key_tail and dirty_tail seg_off from
the cache device and addresses within the segment with it. A seg_off at or
past the segment data_size, controllable by whoever supplies the device
(CAP_SYS_ADMIN), reads past the segment data.
Reject a decoded seg_off that is not below the segment data_size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-pcache: clamp the tail kset read to the segment data region
The tail-kset read in cache_replay(), the writeback worker and the GC
worker bounds its length by PCACHE_SEG_SIZE - seg_off, the raw segment
size rather than the data region. A tail near the segment end reads past
the segment data into the following control area.
Clamp the read to cache_seg_remain(), the data region. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: corsair-void: Check size of status and firmware events before reading them
Malformed status and firmware events could cause an out-of-bounds read since
the size wasn't being checked. Check the size and warn on unexpected values to
avoid this. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
module: validate string table section types
In elf_validity_cache_sechdrs, section sizes and offsets are validated,
unless the section type is SHT_NULL or SHT_NOBITS.
Later, elf_validity_cache_secstrings and elf_validity_cache_index_str
access the section name table (.shstrtab) and symbol string table
(.strtab) headers without first ensuring that their types are
SHT_STRTAB. If a section type is SHT_NULL or SHT_NOBITS, sh_offset has
not been validated and may reference out-of-bounds memory when
dereferenced in elf_validity_cache_secstrings or
elf_validity_cache_strtab.
Validate that both string section headers are of type SHT_STRTAB before
caching them. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-tcp: Do not WARN on remotely-controlled oversized SGL allocations
When fuzzing the nvme target code, I tripped a kernel warning in
nvmet_tcp_map_data() because the length passed into the allocator is
controlled by the remote initiator.
A remote initiator that sends a command with an SGL claiming a huge
number, can create a scatterlist and iovec allocation of over 1 million
entries, which causes the backing kmalloc call to exceed MAX_PAGE_ORDER
and then the page allocator will trip on a WARN_ON_ONCE_GFP() message:
WARNING: mm/page_alloc.c:5280 __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof
Workqueue: nvmet_tcp_wq nvmet_tcp_io_work
...
sgl_alloc_order
nvmet_tcp_map_data
nvmet_tcp_try_recv_pdu
As it's never good to trip a kernel warning remotely due to many systems
having panic-on-warn enabled, let's silence it by just add GFP_NOWARN to
the allocation flags. |
