| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
futex: Also allocate private hash on vfork()
As Jann demonstrated, it is entirely feasible to access the mm through vfork().
Therefore we need to allocate a private hash on vfork() as well as any other
CLONE_VM user.
Specifically, it must be avoided to have (private) futex waiters before
allocating the private hash. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: check IP header size in cfg80211_classify8021d()
A frame that looks like IP can be transmitted, but be too short, so
the DS field is read incorrectly:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in cfg80211_classify8021d+0x99d/0x12b0 net/wireless/util.c:1027
cfg80211_classify8021d+0x99d/0x12b0 net/wireless/util.c:1027
ieee80211_select_queue+0x37a/0x9e0 net/mac80211/wme.c:180
__ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x60f/0x1d90 net/mac80211/tx.c:4304
ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xa8/0x6d0 net/mac80211/tx.c:4538
...
packet_sendmsg+0x9173/0xa2a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3108
Use skb_header_pointer() like the MPLS case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_nat: fully initialise new_addr in netmap setup
nft_nat_setup_netmap() builds the mapped address in an on-stack
union nf_inet_addr. For an IPv4 mapping it writes only the 4-byte .ip
member and the loop runs a single 32-bit iteration, but it then copies
the whole 16-byte union into range->min_addr and range->max_addr, so the
upper 12 bytes reach nf_nat_setup_info() uninitialised.
KMSAN reports an uninit-value in nf_nat_setup_info() reached from
nft_nat_eval(). The IPv6 path fills all 16 bytes and is not affected.
Zero-initialise new_addr. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: brcmfmac: cyw: pass PMKID to firmware if present
Zero out auth_status on initialization. Otherwise, garbage will
leak from the stack to the firmware (when ssid is less than 32 bytes
and/or when params->pmkid is set). Then, pass the params->pmkid to the
firmware (without it, the firmware caches a garbage PMKID on successful
authentication and denies a subsequent association request that includes
the PMKID). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: codecs: rt712-sdca-dmic: fix uninitialized stream_config->type
stream_config is not initialized before being passed to
sdw_stream_add_slave(). The type field may contain garbage and is
later copied to stream->type by sdw_config_stream().
Zero-initialize stream_config so type defaults to SDW_STREAM_PCM.
While at it, use snd_sdw_params_to_config() helper instead of
open-coding the same logic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: wwan: mhi_wwan_mbim: check skb_copy_bits() return value
mhi_mbim_rx() ignores the return value of skb_copy_bits() when it
copies each datagram out of the NTB. The datagram offset and length
come from the DPE, which is only checked to lie within the NTB
itself, so a modem can point a datagram outside the received skb.
The copy then fails and the freshly allocated skbn is passed to
netif_rx() with its uninitialized contents still in place, leaking
kernel heap memory into the network stack.
Free the skb and account an error when the copy fails.
Verified in a QEMU guest with a fault injector pointing a DPE
outside the received NTB: the copy fails, and the unpatched driver
hands the uninitialized skbn to the network stack (observed as
"unknown protocol" on bytes that were never written). With this
check the failed datagram is dropped and counted as an rx error.
Changes in v2: factor the free-and-count sequence out into
mhi_mbim_rx_drop(), shared with the unknown-protocol path, as
suggested by Loic Poulain. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm/dp: skip PUSH_IDLE when the link was never enabled
msm_dp_display_atomic_enable() returns early when link training fails,
leaving ->power_on false and the main link down.
msm_dp_display_atomic_disable() nevertheless writes DP_STATE_CTRL_PUSH_IDLE
and waits for an idle-pattern completion that cannot arrive, so every failed
enable is followed by "PUSH_IDLE pattern timedout".
Every other step of the teardown is already gated on that flag:
msm_dp_display_disable(), called from .atomic_post_disable(), returns early
on !power_on. The PUSH_IDLE write is the only one that is not, so the
controller's runtime-PM reference is then dropped without the link having
been taken down.
On glymur (Snapdragon X2 Elite) the consequence is not a warning. The SoC
does not survive it: TrustZone force-stops the SOCCP and ADSP remote
processors and the machine resets silently about 50 ms later, with no oops
and no panic. On an ASUS Zenbook A16 (UX3607OA), whose eDP panel does not
currently train, this reproduces without any compositor or GPU involvement:
# eDP enable has already failed with "Failed link training (rc=-104)"
echo 1 > /sys/class/graphics/fb0/blank
[535.645455] === marker ===
[535.694833] qcom_q6v5_pas d00000.remoteproc: fatal error received: \
sys_m_smsm.c:512:TZ force stop
[535.694875] remoteproc remoteproc0: crash detected in soccp: type fatal error
[535.728857] qcom_q6v5_pas 6800000.remoteproc: fatal error received: \
sys_m_smsm.c:783:err fatal notification received from TZ
<SoC reset>
Gate the PUSH_IDLE write on ->power_on so the disable path is consistent
with the rest of the teardown. With this applied the same sequence is
harmless and the machine stays up; without it, it resets every time.
The unconditional write dates back to the original DP driver
(c943b4948b58 ("drm/msm/dp: add displayPort driver support")), but the
surrounding code has been restructured several times since, so no Fixes:
tag is offered.
Note that the eDP link-training failure that exposes this on the A16 is a
separate problem in the glymur eDP PHY and is reported separately; this
change is about not damaging the machine when training fails, for whatever
reason.
Tested on ASUS Zenbook A16 (UX3607OA), Snapdragon X2 Elite Extreme, on
linux-next next-20260803 and next-20260807. The machine has since been
running next-20260807 with this patch as its daily driver.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/745167/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ip_tunnel: initialize `options_len` before referencing options
The following command triggers a kernel panic:
ip link add d0 type dummy; ip link set d0 up
ip route add 10.30.0.0/16 \
encap ip id 300 geneve_opts 4660:66:11223344 dev d0
memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 4 byte write of buffer size 0
kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1044!
...
ip_tun_parse_opts.part.0.cold+0x10/0x10
ip_tun_build_state+0x116/0x2a0
On kernels built with GCC 15+ and `CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE`, the fortified
`memcpy()` got 0 sized destination with request of 4 bytes length:
static int ip_tun_parse_opts_geneve(...)
{
...
attr = tb[LWTUNNEL_IP_OPT_GENEVE_DATA];
data_len = nla_len(attr); /* == 4 */
struct geneve_opt *opt = ip_tunnel_info_opts(info) + opts_len;
memcpy(opt->opt_data, nla_data(attr), data_len);
/* ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 0 since options_len is assigned afterwards */
Fixed by initializing the counter before the options are referenced.
Matching what `tunnel_key_opts_set()` already does. |
| Uninitialized resource in Video in Google Chrome prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker to read memory inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Uninitialized resource in ANGLE in Google Chrome on on Windows prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker to read memory outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Uninitialized resource in WebAudio in Google Chrome prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker to read memory inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: evdev - zero absinfo before partial copy in EVIOCSABS
The EVIOCSABS handler copies at most the user supplied ioctl size into
an uninitialized on-stack struct input_absinfo:
if (copy_from_user(&abs, p, min_t(size_t,
size, sizeof(struct input_absinfo))))
The size comes from _IOC_SIZE() of the ioctl command and is therefore
fully controlled by userspace. A short size leaves the trailing part of
the structure holding whatever was on the kernel stack, and the whole
structure is then stored into the device:
dev->absinfo[t] = abs;
EVIOCGABS hands that back to userspace, disclosing the stale stack
bytes. Only the resolution field is currently cleared, which covers the
legacy struct layout but not an arbitrarily short size.
Zero the structure before the copy so any part not supplied by the
caller reads back as zero. The existing resolution fixup is kept, since
it also handles a size that partially overlaps that field. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ata: libahci: clear PxCLBU and PxFBU for AHCI_HFLAG_32BIT_ONLY
A user reported that commit 105c42566a55 ("ata: ahci: force 32-bit DMA for
JMicron JMB582/JMB585") made the JMicron JMB585 unusable on his board.
The failure is seen as soon as the ahci driver is probed, and booting with
iommu=off does not solve the problem.
Looking at the AHCI specification, PxCLBU and PxFBU are both read only '0'
for HBAs that do not support 64-bit addressing.
For HBAs that do support 64-bit addressing, the registers are read write,
with a reset value that is Implementation Specific.
When using the AHCI_HFLAG_32BIT_ONLY flag, the HBA does support 64-bit
addressing, and a 32-bit DMA mask is set by simply clearing HOST_CAP_64.
Thus, in this case, we need to explicitly clear the registers to 0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mmc: spi: reset bytes_xfered before retrying CRC failures
mmc_spi_data_do() updates data->bytes_xfered after each block has been
transferred successfully. If a later block in the same data request
fails with a CRC error, data->bytes_xfered may therefore contain the
number of bytes completed before the failing block.
mmc_spi_request() has a private recovery path for such CRC failures. It
sends STOP_TRANSMISSION, clears data->error and jumps back to
crc_recover to issue the same command and data request again. However,
it does not clear data->bytes_xfered before the retry.
If the retry succeeds, the request is completed with the bytes from the
failed attempt still included in data->bytes_xfered. For a multi-block
request this can make the completed request report more bytes than were
transferred by the successful retry, and can even exceed the request size
when most blocks completed before the CRC error.
This is most likely to be observed on MMC-over-SPI systems where long
multi-block transfers occasionally hit a data CRC error but the
mmc_spi-internal retry succeeds. The data itself is retried, but the
completion accounting is not.
Clear data->bytes_xfered together with data->error before repeating the
request so the final completion reports only the bytes transferred by the
successful attempt. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: zero ff_effect before compat copy in input_ff_effect_from_user
In the compat path input_ff_effect_from_user() aliases the caller's
native struct ff_effect with the smaller struct ff_effect_compat and
copies only the compat sized prefix:
compat_effect = (struct ff_effect_compat *)effect;
if (copy_from_user(compat_effect, buffer,
sizeof(struct ff_effect_compat)))
The tail of the native structure is never written. Callers pass an
uninitialized on-stack object, for example evdev_do_ioctl() for
EVIOCSFF, so those bytes keep their previous stack contents.
input_ff_upload() then stores the full native structure in
ff->effects[id], from where a uinput based force feedback daemon can
read it back via UI_BEGIN_FF_UPLOAD, disclosing kernel stack memory to
userspace.
Zero the effect before the compat copy. |
| A vulnerability was found in the Linux kernel in versions prior to v5.14-rc1. Missing size validations on inbound SCTP packets may allow the kernel to read uninitialized memory. |
| net/can/bcm.c in the Linux kernel through 5.12.10 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory because parts of a data structure are uninitialized. |
| In Python 3.6 through 3.6.10, 3.7 through 3.7.8, 3.8 through 3.8.4rc1, and 3.9 through 3.9.0b4 on Windows, a Trojan horse python3.dll might be used in cases where CPython is embedded in a native application. This occurs because python3X.dll may use an invalid search path for python3.dll loading (after Py_SetPath has been used). NOTE: this issue CANNOT occur when using python.exe from a standard (non-embedded) Python installation on Windows. |
| An issue was discovered in slc_bump in drivers/net/can/slcan.c in the Linux kernel 3.16 through 5.6.2. It allows attackers to read uninitialized can_frame data, potentially containing sensitive information from kernel stack memory, if the configuration lacks CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL, aka CID-b9258a2cece4. |
| Unbound before 1.9.4 accesses uninitialized memory, which allows remote attackers to trigger a crash via a crafted NOTIFY query. The source IP address of the query must match an access-control rule. |
